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Is Prosecution "Medically Appropriate"?
Douglas Mossman, M.D. *
ABSTRACT

Each year, U.S. courts send thousands of incompetent defendants to
hospitals for treatment, where psychiatrists frequently administer
psychotropic medication that can alleviate symptoms and allow the
defendants to proceed with criminal adjudication. Although defendants and
their attorneys usually do not object to such treatment, treatment refusals in
two recent, nationally prominent cases-those of Russell Eugene Weston,
Jr., the accused Capitol shooter, and Charles T. Sell, a dentist charged with
filing false insurance claims-have focused legal and media attention on
whether and under what conditions competence restoration can be forced
on an unwilling defendant.
In its June 2003 decision in Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court
issued guidelines for forcible administration of medication to restore
competence to stand trial. Among those guidelines is a requirement that the
proposed treatment be "medically appropriate." This requirement forces
both testifying and treating physicians to consider some under-appreciated
ethical issues: How can it be proper, or "medically appropriate," for a
physician to treat a patient when "success" makes the patient eligible for
prosecution, a guilty verdict, and punishment? Can any meaningful
consideration of what is "medically appropriate" treatment for a patient
ignore the consequences of treatment which, in the case of many
incompetent criminal defendants, includes the likelihood that they will
regain competence, be prosecuted, and be punished? Where defendants are
charged with capital crimes, can it ever be "medically appropriate" for
doctors to administer antipsychotic therapy, knowing that if convicted, their
patient would face life in prison at the very least, and could possibly be
sentenced to death?
This Article explains why medicating incompetent defendants is ethical,
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despite the practical consequences of such treatment. After summarizing
the psychiatric backgrounds of Weston and Sell, the Article describes
major legal developments in their cases. Next, the Article describes how
the Sell ruling frames the question of medical appropriateness for courts
and testifying physicians, and examines what occurrences of the phrase
"medically appropriate" in case law and medical literature tell us about
what doctors consider when they evaluate a proposed treatment.
The Article then returns to the Sell and Weston cases to review the
arguments made by their attorneys in opposition to administering
antipsychotic medication. The Article then lays out what the author
believes is the strongest argument-grounded in medical ethics, as opposed
to legal concerns-that one might advance for opposing the treatment of
many incompetent defendants. Finally, the Article uses a Kantian
conceptualization of punishment'S justification to show that the same
principles that permit fair, justly administered punishment also provide
physicians with an ethical imperative to give defendants competencerestoring medical therapy.

***
1.

INTRODUCTION

During the past quarter-century, American psychiatrists have maintained
an awkward relationship with the U.S. criminal justice system, and the
awkwardness intensifies in cases where the death penalty is a possibility.
Mental health experts' opinions on matters related to adjudicatory
competence, criminal responsibility, and amenability to treatment are often
crucial to fair trial procedure, accurate determinations of guilt, and
appropriate sentencing by courts. I Those very same opinions, however, can
also be central events in processes that lead to defendants' being put on
trial, found guilty and punished - even, in capital cases, being put to death. 2
Several forensic psychiatrists 3 have recognized a conflict between the
doctor's traditional Hippocratic obligation to help patients and the legal
system's need for psychiatric evidence that may support conviction and
punishment. The late Bernard Diamond dealt with this issue by being a
1.
GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LA WYERS, Chs. 6-9 (2d ed. 1997).
Richard 1. Bonnie, Dilemmas in Administering the Death Penalty: Conscientious
2.
Abstention, Professional Ethics, and the Needs of the Legal System, 14 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 67 (1990).
3.
That is, physicians who specialize in providing mental health expertise to lawyers
and courts. As the website for the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law states:
"Forensic psychiatry is a medical subspecialty that includes research and clinical practice in
the many areas in which psychiatry is applied to legal issues." Available at
http://www.emory.edulAAPLlorg.htm(last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
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"defense psychiatrist" and testifying only when his input might result in a
defendant's exoneration.4 An early career experience as a prosecution
witness led Alan Stone to conclude that the courtroom's expectations made
it unethical for him to use his medical skills as an expert witness. 5
Most forensic psychiatrists, however, have adopted the view
promulgated in a frequently cited 1990 article by Paul Appelbaum. He
suggests that doctors can resolve the moral dilemma posed by testimony
that aids the prosecution by recognizing "a qualitatively different basis for
forensic ethics,,6 in which "beneficence and nonmaleficence are not the
obligatory primary duties.,,7 Appelbaum believes that doing good and
avoiding harm are paramount duties for psychiatrists only insofar as they
act as physicians, that is, only when they have assumed the characteristic
responsibilities of a clinician who administers treatment.
[T]he forensic psychiatrist in truth does not act as a physician .... If the
essence of the physician's role is to promote healing and/or to relieve
suffering, it is apparent that the forensic psychiatrist operates outside
the scope of that role.... [W]ere we to call such a person a
"forensicist" some other similar appellation, it might more easily be
apparent that a different nonmedical role with its own ethical values is
involved. 8

Although his position has received some criticism,9 Dr. Appelbaum's
4.
Bernard L. Diamond, From Durham to Brawner: A Futile Journey, WASH. U.
L.Q. 109, 116 (1973).
5.
Alan A. Stone, Presidential Address: Conceptual Ambiguity and Morality in
Modern Psychiatry, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 887, 887-89 (1980); see also Alan A. Stone,
The Ethics of Forensic Psychiatry: A View from the Ivory Tower, in LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND
MORALITY: ESSAYS AND ANALYSIS 57 (1984) (arguing that psychiatrists lack appropriate
ethical guidelines for courtroom conduct).
6.
Paul S. Appelbaum, The Parable of the Forensic Psychiatrist: Ethics and the
Problem ofDoing Harm, 13 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 249, 254 (1990).
7.
ld at 252.

8.

Id

9.
To my knowledge, the most vehement criticism of Dr. Appelbaum's views is
Alfred M. Freedman & Abraham L. Halpern, The Psychiatrist's Dilemma: a Conflict of
Roles in Legal Executions, 33 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 629, 629 (Oct. 1999) (stating:
"This justification has similarities to the rationale offered by physicians involved in human
experiments and other criminal acts in Nazi Germany, as well as psychiatrists in the former
Soviet Union.").
For other criticisms, see S. N. Verdun-Jones, Forensic Psychiatry, Ethics and Protective
Sentencing: What Are the Limits of Psychiatric Participation in the Criminal Justice
Process?, 399 ACTA PSYCHIATRY SCAND. SUPPL. 77, 77 (2000) (rejecting "the view that a
forensic psychiatrist, who undertakes an evaluation for the state, is to be considered as an
advocate of justice who is not bound by conventional ethical duties to the individual"
undergoing evaluation), and Douglas Mossman, Is Forensic Testimony Fundamentally
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distinction between customary medical ethics and the obligations of an
expert witness has gained wide acceptance. In its ethical guidelines, the
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law ("AAPL") makes this
distinction an essential feature of a properly conducted forensic interview:
"before beginning a forensic evaluation, psychiatrists should inform the
evaluee that although they are psychiatrists, they are not the evaluee's
'doctor.",lo The same distinction underlies reasoning in a 1995 report by
the American Medical Association ("AMA") concerning evaluations of,
and providing testimony about, a condemned inmate's competence to be
executed: "The important principle in this situation is that the physician is
acting as an advocate of justice, not as a source of punishment. The
physician is acting as an expert advisor providing important information
that assists in the pursuit of a just result." I
Over the last few years, however, two nationally prominent criminal
cases have posed-more precisely, have forced psychiatrists to addressan ethical dilemma that the therapist-expert distinction cannot resolve. The
first case involves Russell Eugene Weston, Jr., accused of fatally shooting
two Capitol police officers in July 1998. According to press reports and
legal opinions, Weston has a long history of mental illness and became
increasingly delusional after his arrest. In April 1999, the federal district
judge assigned to preside over the criminal trial ruled that Weston was
"incompetent to stand trial," meaning that he could not consult rationally
with his lawyers or comprehend the proceedings against him. The second
case is that of Charles T. Sell, a St. Louis area dentist arrested in 1997 for
filing false insurance claims. Public record documents report that, like
Weston, Sell has suffered from a serious mental disorder for several years,
symptoms which led to his being found incompetent to stand trial the same
month as Weston.
Each year, U.S. courts send thousands of incompetent defendants to
hospitals for treatment. 12 Typically, that treatment includes psychotropic

Immoral?, 17 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 347 (1994).
10.
American Academy of Psychiatry & the Law Ethical Guidelines for the Practice
of Forensic Psychiatry, Section II, at http://www.emory.edulAAPLIethics.htm (last visited
Nov. 23, 2004).
II.
Freedman & Halpern, supra note 9, at 631 (quoting Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs, Report 6-A-95, Physician Participation in Capital Punishment:
Evaluations of Prisoner Competence to be Executed: Treatment to Restore Competence to
be Executed, in Proceedings of the House of Delegates of the American Psychiatric
Association: 144th Annual Meeting 223 (1995)).
12.
Precise numbers on these matters are hard to come by. A frequently cited estimate
is that in the United States, "approximately 60,000 defendants, or between 2% and 8% of all
felony defendants are referred for fitness to stand trial assessments each year." Jodi L.
Viljoen & Patricia A. Zapf, Fitness to Stand Trial Evaluations: A Comparison of Referred
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medications that often alleviate symptoms to a point where the defendant
can proceed with criminal adjudication. 13 In most cases, patients and their
attorneys do not object to such treatment. But in Sell's and Weston's cases,
attorneys kept their clients from receiving psychotropic drugs for years,
arguing that such medication would interfere with their clients' rights to a
fair trial. Weston's lawyers went further, and argued that by medicating the
client, doctors would be violating their professional obligation to help their
patients. This was because "successful" treatment would set in motion a
chain of events that could lead to Weston's being tried, convicted,
imprisoned, and possibly executed for murder.
While Weston's case was before the federal trial court and the D.C.
Court of Appeals, psychiatrists were not permitted to give him
antipsychotic drug therapy. In December 2001, however, the U.S. Supreme
Court refused to hear appeals challenging lower courts' decisions that
authorized treating Weston,14 and he began to receive medication. Just

and Non-Referred Defendants, 1 INT'L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 127, 127 (2002)
(citations omitted). A Virginia study suggests that roughly one-sixth of these individuals are
found incompetent to stand trial. Janet 1. Warren et aI., Beyond Competence and Sanity: The
Influence of Pretrial Evaluation on Case Disposition, 22 BULL. AMER. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
LAW 379, 381 (1994). "The best available data-though somewhat dated-suggest that
approximately 3400 incompetent defendants are hospitalized for treatment at any point in
time." THOMAS G. GUTHEIL & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAW 266 (3d ed. 2000).
A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that this last estimate is still reasonable.
Information obtained on the Internet shows that on November 30, 2002, 173 patients were
undergoing competence restoration in Ohio public sector hospitals (which are the only sites
where competence restoration occurs in the state). Available at www.jamesraia.com (last
visited Nov. 23, 2004). U.S. census estimates from 2003 put Ohio's population at
11,435,708 and the U.S. population at 290,809,777, or about 25.4 times that of Ohio.
Available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfdlstates/39000.html(last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
Extrapolating from Ohio's figures (i.e., multiplying 173 times 25.4) suggests that
approximately 4400 persons are hospitalized nationally-in rough agreement with the figure
cited by Gutheil and Appelbaum.
13.
One study, for example, reports an 89.5% success rate for competence restoration.
Robert A. Nicholson et aI., Predicting Treatment Outcome for Incompetent Defendants, 22
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 367 (1994). Concerning the matter on which this Article
focuses-involuntary medication for restoration-a New York state study found that eightyseven percent of incompetent felony defendants involuntarily treated with medication were
ultimately restored to competence. Brian Ladds et aI., Involuntary Medication of Patients
Who Are Incompetent to Stand Trial: A Descriptive Study of the New York Experience with
Judicial Review, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 529 (1993). For a review of studies
concerning involuntary medication to restore competence, see Brian Ladds & Antonio
Convit, Involuntary Medication of Patients Who Are Incompetent to Stand Trial: A Review
ofEmpirical Studies, 22 1. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 519 (1994).
14. Weston v. U.S., 534 U.S. 1067 (2001).
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eleven months later, however, the Supreme Court granted certiorari l5 after
Sell's efforts to avoid medication failed at the district and appellate court
levels. In its June 2003 decision in Sell v. United States,16 the Supreme
Court issued guidelines under which U.S. trial courts could order
administration of medication solely for the purpose of restoring a
defendant's competence to stand trial. Among those guidelines is a
requirement that the proposed treatment be "medically appropriate. "
This Article contends that this requirement forces both testifying and
treating physicians to confront a neglected, under-appreciated ethical issue:
How can it be proper conduct-how can it be "medically appropriate"-for
a physician to treat a patient when "success" makes the patient eligible for
prosecution, a guilty verdict, and punishment? Even if a trial court issues
an order making it legally permissible for doctors to medicate a defendantpatient over his objection, is it ethically appropriate for doctors to do so?
Can any meaningful consideration of what is "medically appropriate"
treatment for a patient ignore the consequences of treatment, which, in the
case of many incompetent criminal defendants, includes the likelihood that
they will regain competence, be prosecuted, and be punished? How, in
Russell Weston's case, can it be "medically appropriate" for doctors to
administer antipsychotic therapy, knowing that, if convicted, their patient
would face life in prison at the very least, and could possibly be sentenced
to death?
In responding to the questions in the preceding paragraph, this Article
explains why medicating incompetent defendants is ethical, despite the
practical consequences of such treatment. Part II summarizes Weston's
psychiatric background, major legal developments following the Capitol
shootings, and his attorneys' efforts to keep him from getting antipsychotic
medication. Part III reviews similar events in Sell's case, and describes
how the Supreme Court's Sell decision frames the question of medical
appropriateness for courts and testifying physicians. Part IV examines
occurrences of the phrase "medically appropriate" in case law and medical
literature to develop a sense of what things doctors consider when asked
(on or off the witness stand) about a particular treatment.
Part V returns to legal and ethical arguments offered by attorneys for
Sell and Weston. Part VI lays out what the author believes is the strongest
argument-grounded in medical ethics, as opposed to legal concerns -that
one might advance for opposing the treatment of Weston and many other
15.
Sell v. United States, 537 U.S. 999, 999-1000 (2002) (granting certiorari on the
issue of "[w]hether the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting petitioner's argument that
allowing the government to administer antipsychotic medication against his will solely to
render him competent to stand trial for non-violent offenses would violate his rights under
the First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.").
16.
539 U.S. 166 (2003).
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incompetent defendants. Part VII describes a conceptualization of
punishment's justification, and Part VIII concludes that the principals that
permit fair, justly administered punishment provide physicians with an
ethical imperative to give defendants competence-restoring medical
therapy. Part IX examines these issues in the context of defendants whose
competence restoration will allow them to face charges that carry the death
penalty.
II.

RUSSELL EUGENE WESTON, JR.

A. Background 17
Weston was born to married parents in December 1956 and grew up in
Illinois. After graduating in the lower third of his high school class in 1974,
he moved to Montana. There, he rented a cabin and earned the nickname
"Crusty Rusty" because he changed his clothes infrequently. He held a
series of jobs over the next nine years; his trouble sustaining employment
seemed related to difficulties getting along with others. In the mid-1980s he
underwent medical evaluations for various physical complaints. Psychiatric
and psychological evaluators detected paranoid and grandiose thinking, but
did not diagnose a major mood or thought disorder. He began receiving SSI
payments for asymptomatic polyneuropathy l8 of the lower extremities,
cervical strain, and a mixed personality disorder; in April 1989, when those
payments had been stopped, he requested reconsideration, saying, "I am
accusing SSI of deceptive acts and fraud, refusal to give me copies of
doctor reports, refusal to reset doctor appointment with non-abusive
doctor.,,19 In December 1989, a psychiatric examiner wrote, "This man has
not been believed to be schizophrenic, but does display a lot of paranoia,
hostility, and difficulty assessing reality.,,2o
Around 1990, Weston's parents noted that he became "obsessed" about
a kidnapping. Eventually, Weston thought the victim was Chelsea Clinton,
17.
This Part's information on Weston's background comes primarily from a report
prepared by David G. Daniel, M.D., who evaluated Weston for the federal district court.
One can find Dr. Daniel's report at http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/district-court-2000.html
(last visited Nov. 23, 2004). News articles elucidate some details that Dr. Daniel's report
does not make clear.
18.
"Polyneuropathy is the simultaneous malfunction of many peripheral nerves
throughout the body." THE MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION-SECOND HOME
EDITION Ch. 95, § 6 (2004), available at http://www.merck.comlmrksharedlrnmanual_home
2/sec06/ch095/ch095h.jsp (last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
19.
Evaluation of Defendant by Dr. David G. Daniel, U.S. v. Russell Eugene Weston,
Jr., Case No. 98CR-357, at 7, available at http://www.dcd. uscourts.gov /district-court2000.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Daniel's Report].
20.
ld. at 8.
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and he developed an elaborate set of illogical beliefs related to this. By the
mid-1990s, he thought that he had secret information about being the target
of a government plot and that President Clinton wanted him dead. In May
1996, Weston underwent psychiatric hospitalization in Helena, Montana,
where he told care-givers that President Clinton and government officials
were harassing him, that an airplane was poisoning him, and that a
radioactive chip implanted in his jaw let him communicate with the
Russian ambassador. Two months later, Weston traveled to Washington,
D.C. to aPRly for a CIA job. During the interview (which was
videotaped), 1 Weston said he was "a clone," talked about pre-birth
bombardment with microwaves, and discussed a movie made by President
Kennedy in which Weston and President Clinton were actors.22
After Weston sent a letter to the White House that accused President
Clinton of sending CIA agents to kill him, state health officials in Montana
committed him to a public mental hospital in October 1996. 23 By the end of
a fifty-five day hospital stay, staff members had concluded that Weston
suffered from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type,24 and had benefited
from treatment with loxapine and divalproex sodium. 25 At a follow-up
appointment several days after discharge, however, he was not taking
medication and seemed "very bizarre and paranoid. ,,26
During the next twenty months, Weston often lived with his parents in
Illinois. In mid-July 1998, Weston's grandmother paid him to shoot several
of the stray cats that lived on the family's property. This upset Weston's
father, who was fond of the cats, and the father told his son to find another
21.
Anne Hull, A Living Hell or a Life Saved? Capitol Shooter's Untreated Madness
Fuels Legal and Ethical Debate, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2001, at AI.
22.
A transcript of the interview appeared in the June 2001 issue of Harper's
Magazine, and may be viewed at http://articles.findarticles.comJp/articles/mi_mlllllis_181
3_302/ai_7Sl220l6 (last visited Nov. 23,2004).
Jon Jeter, Suspect's Family Recalls His Ailing Mind, Aimless Life, WASH. POST,
23.
July 27, 1998, at AI.
24.
Schizoaffective disorder is a chronic, severe mental illness during which, at some
point, an episode of mania or depression coincides with the psychotic symptoms (e.g.,
hallucinations, delusions, or disorganized speech) that characterize schizophrenia.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS, FOURTH EDITION, TEXT REVISION 319 (2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. The
descriptor "bipolar type" refers to manic symptoms that are part of the iIIness's presentation.
/d. at 321.
25.
Loxapine is the generic name for Loxitane®, an antipsychotic medication
"indicated for the treatment of schizophrenia." PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 3300 (57th
ed. 2003). Divalproex sodium is the generic name for Depakote®, a multi-use medication
"indicated for the treatment of the manic episodes associated with bipolar disorder." /d. at
432.
26.
Daniel's Report, supra note 19, at 14.
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place to live. On July 23, 1998 (the day before the Capitol shootings),
Weston left his parents' home with his father's revolver, and drove 755
miles to Washington, D.C.
The next day, according to the government's indictment, Weston shot
and killed two Capitol officers. Weston believed that "cannibals" had used
a "ruby Satellite system" to spread a dread disease ("Black Heva") that
threatened the entire U.S. population. Weston believed that the system's
override console was located in the Capitol building, and was trying to gain
access to the console when he shot the two officers. 27 The second officer
returned fire and wounded Weston, who was then taken to D.C. General
Hospital for treatment of multiple gun shot wounds and bone fractures.
Weston remained there until October 1998, when he was transferred to a
correctional treatment facility.
B.

Post-Arrest Evaluations and Testimony

The federal trial court asked Sally C. Johnson, M.D. to evaluate Weston.
She concluded that Weston had a "mental disease rendering him mentally
incompetent to understand the nature and consequence of the proceedings
against him and assist in his defense.,,28 On February 3, 1999, Weston was
sent for additional competence evaluations to the U.S. Medical Center for
Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri ("USMC-Springfield").
However, he would not share personal information or discuss his legal
situation with the clinicians who tried to evaluate him, replying
stereotypically, '''Upon the advice of my attorneys I have no comment, '" or
similar phrases. 29
On April 29, 1999, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan of the D.C. federal district
court ruled that Weston was incompetent to stand trial, and sent him to a
treatment facility at the Federal Correctional Institution in Butner, North
Carolina ("FCI-Butner"), where Dr. Johnson works. For the next three
years, Weston remained at FCI-Butner except for times when he traveled to
Washington DC for hearings; he spent much of his time in seclusion.
Clinicians at FCI-Butner thought Weston should be given antipsychotic
therapy, but Judge Sullivan's order specified that Weston could not receive
involuntary psychotropic medication without the court's prior approval. On
September 9, 1999, following two administrative hearings held at FCIButner and two district court hearings on the issue of involuntary treatment,
Judge Sullivan concluded that psychotropic medication was "medically

27. Bill Miller, Weston's Mind-set Detailed: Capitol Suspect Feared Disease,
Cannibal Threat, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1999, at AI.
28. Bill Miller, Capitol Suspect Not Fit for Trial, Doctor Reports, WASH. POST, Dec.
5, 1998, at B 1.
29.
Daniel's Report, supra note 19, at 20.
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appropriate and that, considering less intrusive alternatives, it [wa]s
essential for the defendant's own safety or the safety of others[,],,3o and
authorized FCI-Butner clinicians to medicate Weston involuntarily.
The district court also stayed its order to pennit defense lawyers to file
an appeal. They did, and on March 24, 2000, a panel of the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the medication order and remanded the case to
the district court for further fact-finding. The appeals court panel found that
the record indicated "that in his current circumstances Weston poses no
significant danger to himself or to others.,,3) The panel directed the district
court to consider whether medication was necessary to render Weston
competent to stand trial, an issue the lower court had expressly avoided in
its September 1999 decision. The district court also was to "consider the
potential impact of compelled medication on Weston's Sixth Amendment
fair trial right. ,,32
Finally, in a footnote, the Court of Appeals' panel directed the district
court to "also consider whether there is any merit to Weston's contention
that medical ethics preclude ordering a patient medicated in a potential
capital case.,,33 This matter had been raised by defense counsel in the
district court hearings, but was expressly ignored in Judge Sullivan's
September 1999 decision. Because the government had not yet announced
that it would seek the death penalty, the case, wrote Judge Sullivan, had
"not at this time-and it may never-present the issue of medicating a
person to restore his mental competency to execute him. ,,34
During the July 2000 district court hearings, several testifying clinicians
said that Weston's mental condition had deteriorated at FCI-Butner in the
absence of antipsychotic therapy, and that he was dangerous to himself and
others. He was deteriorating mentally and physically because he could or
would not cooperate with needed physical therapy. He was at an ongoing,

30.
U.S. v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99, 118 (D.D.C. 1999).
31.
U.S. v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9,13 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
32.
Id. at 14. In a concurring opinion, Judge Tatel stated that forced medication might
implicate four defendant's rights: (1) the right not to be tried unless he is competent to
consult with counsel and assist in preparing a defense; (2) the right to testify and present his
version of events - perhaps in a psychotic state; (3) the right to be present in court
throughout his trial; and (4) the right to present an insanity defense. Judge Tatel noted that
drug side effects might "flatten or deaden" Weston's emotional responses and influence
jurors' opinions about his remorsefulness, which in tum could affect their judgments about
imposing the death penalty. If medications ameliorated his symptoms, jurors might not find
his own testimony about a former psychosis nearly as convincing as testimony delivered by
a man who still harbored the delusions that made him travel to the Capitol. ld. at 19-20
(Tatel, J., concurring).
33.
U.S. v. Weston, 206 F.3d at 14 n.3.
34.
U.S. v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 119.
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high risk of suicide, and he posed a risk to staff members who entered his
room to care for him. The psychiatrists believed there was a substantial
likelihood that antipsychotic medication would lower these risks and
restore Weston's competence to stand trial. The benefits of antipsychotic
medication outweighed potential side effects, they said, and side effects
could be managed if they occurred. Finally, the psychiatrists said that
current professional ethical canons contained no proscription against
involuntarily administering medication to restore a defendant's
competence, even if the medication would make the defendant subject to
legal proceedings that could result in a guilty verdict and a death
sentence. 35
On August 23, 2000, the district court appointed its own expert, Dr.
David G. Daniel, "for the purpose of providing the Court with an expert
opinion as to whether it is in the defendant's medical interests to administer
anti-psychotic medication without his consent.,,36 In a report filed several
weeks later, and at a hearing held November 15,2000, Dr. Daniel said that
such treatment was in Weston's interest. Dr. Daniel wrote:
The detennination of whether a treatment is in the medical interest of a
patient involves fundamental questions:
1. Does the patient have a diagnosable illness causing the patient to
experience significant distress or disability?
2. Does a treatment exist that is available and appropriate for treatment
of that condition?
3. Is the treatment reasonably safe and is the treatment likely to be
reasonably well tolerated?
4. Is there a less invasive treatment that may provide adequate benefit?
5. Does an individual clinical risk-benefit analysis for the patient
indicate that the treatment is in the patient's medical interest?37

Dr. Daniel thought involuntary treatment offered several potential
benefits to Weston, including "[a]melioration of symptoms that distress[ ed]
35.
This paragraph summarizes opinions of the government's expert witnesses, which
includes Dr. Johnson, Dr. Debra DePrato, and Dr. Howard Zonana. See U.S. v. Weston, 255
F.3d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and Brief for Appellant, U.S. v. Weston, available at
http://www.dcfpd.org/motions/appeals/drug%20expert/weston2.htm (last visited Nov. 23,
2004) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant). Dr. Zonana acknowledged that pre-trial treatment
could initiate a chain of events in which execution could result. Id.
36.
Daniel's Report, supra note 19, at 29.
37.
Id.
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the patient" and impaired Weston's functioning, reducing his risk of
harming himself or others, preventing "an extended, very prolonged period
of untreated behavioral regression," and "gaining ,insight into the nature of
his illness and its treatments.,,38 No recent peer-reviewed publication would
support leaving a schizophrenic patient unmedicated, for a prolonged
period, said Dr. Daniel. Without medication, Weston would remain in
seclusion indefinitely, which could "interact with and worsen core
'negative' symptoms of schizophrenia ... Involuntary medication appears
to be a more medically appropriate intervention and more in the patient's
medical interest than living for years in seclusion.,,39 These considerations
led Dr. Daniel to conclude "that it is currently medically appropriate andin
the defendant's medical interest to treat him with antipsychotic medication
without hisconsent.,,40
'
Judge Sullivan issued his next decision on March 6, 2001. He held that
Weston's potential desire to be and look psychotic when presenting an
insanity defense had to be balanced against the government's need to bring
him to trial. Noting that "antipsychotic medication is the only, therapeutic
intervention that may address Weston's symptoms, lessen his delusions,
and make him competent to stand trial,,,41 Judge Sullivan ruled that
involuntary treatment was the "medically appropriate" means of treating
Weston's illness,42 and authorized FCI-Butner to administer competencerestoring drugs.
Judge Sullivan stayed the medication order while Weston's lawyers
appealed his decision. 43 On July 27,2001, the D.C. appeals court affirmed
Judge Sullivan's ruling, and explicitly rejected the idea that ethical
principles were relevant to a determination that Weston should be forcibly
medicated: "Even if a particular doctor had ethical objections to
administering antipsychotic drugs to a non-consenting patient, this would
not undercut the consensus in the medical profession that anti-psychotic
medication is the medically appropriate response to Weston's condition.,,44
On December 10, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court declined Weston's request
to review the appellate court's affirmation of the medication order. 45
Federal law makes an appeals court decision effective when the Supreme
Court declines to review it, meaning that the legal barriers to Weston's

42.
43.

Jd. at 39.
Jd. at 38, 42.
Jd. at 43.
U.S. v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 121 (2001).
Jd. at 138.
Jd.

44.
45.

U.S. v. Weston, 255 F.3d at 878.
Weston v. U.S., 534 U.S. 1067 (2001).

38.

39.
40,

41.
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treatment had been removed. 46 Weston began receiving antipsychotic
medication in January 200247 but never became competent to stand trial.
Following a hearing in mid-November 2004, Judge Sullivan ruled that
Weston was unlikely to soon become competent and recommended that he
be committed to a federal mental hospital, while leaving open the
possibility that Weston could undergo trial for murder should he ever
become competent. 48
III. CHARLES THOMAS SELL, D.D.S.
A.

Background

Sell graduated from college in 1972, and married his first wife, Deborah,
in 1977, a year after he completed dental school. 49 He operated a private
practice in Des Peres, Missouri (a St. Louis suburb), and between 1982 and
1990, he served in the Army Dental Reserve, eventually achieving the rank
of Major. 5o
During the 1980s and 1990s, Sell experienced emotional problems and
was arrested for assault, resisting arrest, and false imprisonment; he
received a two-year suspended sentence on the false imprisonment charge
for keeping a woman in his office. He had many contacts with the local
police department and filed several harassment accusations against its
officers. He had claimed that the Governor and the local police chief were
trying to kill him. When the Missouri Dental Board investigated allegations
against him, Sell went to the investigator's home and threatened him, and
threatened the investigator's wife over the telephone. He kept guns at his
office and told an employee he would shoot insurance examiners if they
came to look at his records. 51
Sell underwent hospitalization in September 1982, having claimed at one
point that communists had contaminated the gold he use for fillings. 52
46.
Neely Tucker, High Court Passes on Capitol Suspect: Decision Clears Way For
Medicating Weston, WASH. POST, Dec. 11,2001, at B1.
47.
U.S. v. Weston, 260 F. Supp. 2d 147, 149 (D. D.C. 2003) (Memorandum Opinion
& Order issued May 1,2003 by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan).
48.
Carol D. Leonnig, Capitol Suspect Still Unfit for Trial: Hospitalization Advised
for Man Accused of Killing Officers, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 25, 2004, at B7; U.S. v.
Weston, Crim. No. 98-357 (EGS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23579, at *2-6 (D. D.C. Nov. 22,
2004).
49.
Brief of Appellant at 3, Sell v. United States, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002) (No.
01-1862) [hereinafter Appellant BriefJ.
50.
Id. at 3-4.
51.
Brief of Appellee at 4-5, Sell v. United States, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002) (No.
01-1862) [hereinafter Appellee BriefJ.
52.
Sell v. U.S., 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003).
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Sell's first wife left him in 1983, which caused him great emotional
difficulty. 53 In 1984, Sell again underwent hospitalization after police
responded to a 9-1-1 call in which Sell reported a leopard outside his
office. When police arrived at the office, Sell told them, "Go ahead and
shoot me, the leopard is getting on the bus! Shoot me! Shoot me!,,54 During
the multi-year course of his illness, Sell received antidepressant
medications; for a short time, he also took the antipsychotic medication
haloperidol, which caused him severe side effects and which he likened to
having a "lobotomy.,,55
In April 1997, the FBI searched Sell's office and home. Just after this,
Sell asked one of his employees whether she was willing to die for him,
and said he wished to "kill the bastards." The employee contacted the FBI
and agreed to wear a transmitter wire at the office. By means of the
transmitter, FBI agents heard talking about bombing the home of an FBI
supervisor and saying that G-d had told him "a soul will be saved" for
every FBI agent that Sell killed. 56
B.

Sell's Arrest and Adjudicatory Incompetence

On May 16, 1997, the authorities arrested Sell on charges of submitting
false insurance claims. Because of his history of mental problems, the
Government asked that Sell undergo examination of his competence to
stand trial. The examining psychologist concluded that Sell had a "paranoid
personality disorder" but was neither psychotic nor incompetent to stand
trial. The psychologist cautioned, however, that Sell might become
psychotic in the future. Later, a grand jury produced a superseding
indictment charging Sell and his second wife with numerous counts of
health insurance fraud, Medicaid fraud, and money laundering. 57
In August 1997, Sell was released on bond, but was re-arrested in
January 1998 after the Government claimed that he had tried to intimidate a
witness. 58 At an initial bail revocation hearing, Sell screamed, uttered
personal insults and racial slurs, and spat in the presiding magistrate's face.
A psychiatrist reported that Sell's condition had worsened: he was not
sleeping and was more paranoid. Sell's bail was revoked, and in April
1998, he received the additional criminal charges of attempting to murder a
former employee who planned to testify against him in the fraud case and

53.
54.
.55.
56.
57.
58.

Appellant Brief, supra note 49, at 4.
Appellee Brief, supra note 51, at 4 n.l.
Appellant Brief, supra note 49, at 5.
Appellee Brief, supra note 51, at 5-6.
Sell, 539 U.S. at 170; Appellant Brief, supra note 49, at 3-4.
Appellant Brief, supra note 49, at 8.
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the FBI agent who had arrested him. 59
In April 1999, Sell underwent evaluation at USMC-Springfield after he
had asked the Court to reconsider his competence to stand trial. Sell was
found incompetent to stand trial and returned to USMC-Springfield for a
four-month assessment to see whether treatment might restore his capacity
to proceed with adjudication. After two months, psychiatrist James
Wolfson and psychologist Richart DeMier (both USMC-Springfield
clinicians) recommended that Sell take antipsychotic medication. When he
refused to do so, USMC-Springfield initiated proceedings for getting
approval to medicate Sell over his objection. 60
The first two steps involved reviews within USMC-Springfield of the
treating clinicians' recommendations. In June 1999, Dr. Charles Glazzard,
a non-treating psychiatrist, considered Sell's mental health history,
delusions of persecution, an outside psychiatrist's views, Sell's opinion,
and opinions of laypersons who knew Sell and believed he had no mental
illness. Dr. Glazzard thought involuntary administration of medication was
proper because Sell was mentally ill, dangerous, and in need of medication
to treat his mental illness and to become mentally fit for trial. Dr. Glazzard
noted that the determination of dangerousness reflected what Sell might do
if released in the community, rather than risks that he posed while confined
to USMC-Springfield. 61
Next, USMC-Springfield administratively reviewed what Dr. Glazzard
had recommended, concluded that antipsychotic medication was the
treatment most likely to benefit Sell and address his delusions, and upheld
Dr. Glazzard's conclusions about treatment. The reviewing official also
noted that other forms of treatment were unlikely to be effective, and that
Sell's pervasive persecutory delusions and his attempted murder charges
signaled a risk of violence were he to return to the community.62
In July 1999, Sell filed a court motion to contest USMC-Springfield's
right to force antipsychotic drugs on him. On September 29, 1999, a federal
magistrate held a hearing at which the evidence mostly replicated matters
considered at the USMC-Springfield administrative hearing. However, Drs.
Wolfson and DeMier discussed the question of the medication's
effectiveness more thoroughly, and they also testified about Sell's behavior
following the administrative proceedings. This included a July 1999
incident in which Sell approached a USMC-Springfield nurse and
suggested that he was in love with her. When told that his behavior was
inappropriate and that he should stop it, Sell indicated that this kind of

59.
60.
61.
62.

Sell, 539 U.S. at 170.
Id. at 170-71; Appellant Brief, supra note 49, at 12.
Sell, 539 U.S. at 171-72; Appellant Brief, supra note 49, at 12-13.
Sell, 539 U.S. at 172.
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conduct would continue. Drs. Wolfson and DeMier said that given Sell's
history and unwillingness to desist, such amorous incidents were not
harmless and showed he was a safety risk, even while confined within
USMC-Springfield. 63
On April 9, 2000, the magistrate ruled that government had shown that
(1) Sell was dangerousness to himself and others at USMC-Springfield, (2)
antipsychotic medication was "the only way to render him less dangerous,"
(3) the availability of newer antipsychotic drugs would reduce the risk of
severe side effects, (4) the benefits of medication outweighed the risks, (4)
there was "a substantial probability" that antipsychotic medication would
render Sell competent to stand trial, and (5) receiving such medications was
the only way for Sell to achieve competence. The magistrate authorized
involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs, but stayed his order
while Sell appealed to the federal district court. 64
The district court issued its opinion a year later, in April 2001, and
determined that, because Sell was currently housed in an open ward within
USMC-Springfield, he was not dangerous to himself or others in his
current living situation. The district court nonetheless affirmed the
magistrate's order to medicate Sell because such treatment was "medically
appropriate," constituted "the only viable hope of rendering defendant
competent to stand trial," and served "the government's compelling interest
in obtaining an adjudication of defendant's guilt or innocence.,,65
Both the Government and Sell appealed, and on March 7, 2002, a panel
of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 2-to-l the district court's
judgment. 66 The panel's majority agreed with the district court that Sell's
behavior toward the nurse did not constitute evidence of dangerousness
while he was at USMC-Springfield. 67 The majority also agreed that Sell's
fraud charges were serious enough that the Government had a "paramount"
interest in restoring his mental fitness for trial, and that competence could
not be achieved by a means "less intrusive" than antipsychotic
medication. 68 The dissenting judge believed that charges of fraud and
money laundering were "not serious enough" to justify forcing Sell to take
antipsychotic medication. 69
In November 2002, the U.S. Supreme granted certiorari to determine
whether the Eighth Circuit's decision to let the Government involuntarily

63.
64.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 172-73.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 173-74.
Sell v. United States, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 565.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 574 (Bye, J., dissenting).
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medicate Sell would violate his Constitutional rights guaranteed by the
First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. 70
C. The Supreme Court's Sell Decision
In a 6-to-3 decision,11 the Supreme Court ruled that a pre-trial detainee
in Sell's position might indeed be forced to take antipsychotic medication
to restore competence to stand trial. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
looked to rulings and dicta from its two previous decisions on involuntary
medication, Washington v. Harper72 and Riggins v. Nevada. 73
Neither earlier decision had addressed the question of medicating a pretrial detainee solely for the purpose of rendering him competent. Harper, a
1990 decision, concerned a mentally ill prison inmate for whom doctors
had recommended antipsychotic drugs to treat his illness and to reduce his
dangerousness to himself and others; the Court had concluded that
Washington State's procedures for administering such medication was a
constitutionally acceptable "accommodation between an inmate's liberty
interest in avoiding the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs and the
State's interests in providing appropriate medical treatment to reduce the
danger" posed by the inmate. 7 Riggins, issued in 1992, concerned a pretrial detainee who had not been found incompetent to stand trial, but who
was nonetheless forced to take antipsychotic medication and later convicted
of murder. A Supreme Court majority overturned Riggins's conviction and
remanded the case on grounds that the medication had possibly prejudiced
his fair trial rights. 75 Six members of the Riggins court had noted, however,
that forced medication might be permissible in cases where such treatment
was necessary to assure a pre-trial detainee's safety or the safety of others,
or where no means less intrusive than medication would allow the
Government to achieve an adjudication of guilt or innocence. 76

70.

Sell v. United States, 537 U.S. 999 (2002).
Three justices did not join with the majority on grounds that neither the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. Sell v.
u.s., 539 U.S. 166,216 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (holding that the district court's Apr. 4,2001
order was neither a "final decision" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 nor one of the types of specified
interlocutory orders discussed in 28 U.S.C. § 1292). The majority concluded that the district
court's decision was an appealable collateral order, and that the appeals court had
jurisdiction. Sell, 539 U.S. at 175-77.
72.
494 U.S. 210 (1990).
73.
504 U.S. 127 (1992).
74.
Harper, 494 U.S. at 236.
75.
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137-8.
76.
Id. at 135. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, but took a much more
critical view of antipsychotic medication. After reviewing the potential side effects of the
antipsychotic drugs available in 1992, and the possibility that these side effects might
71.
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Guided by Harper and Riggins, the Sell majority opinion, per Justice
Breyer, concluded that
the Constitution permits the Government to involuntarily administer
antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal
charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but
only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely
to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and,
taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is significantly necessary to
further important governmental trial-related interests. 77

To implement this conclusion, said the Sell majority, trial courts must
investigate four matters. First, trial courts should evaluate the importance
of prosecution by considering (a) the seriousness of the allegations against
the defendant, (b) how long the defendant has already been confined (i. e.,
time that could count against any sentence he might receive), and (c)
whether the defendant might, if not treated, be confined to a psychiatric
hospital for a lengthy period, which "would diminish the risks that
ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment one who has committed a
serious crime.,,78 Second, a trial court must conclude that the proposed
medication would "be substantially likely" to render the defendant fit to
stand trial without causing side effects that would interfere with his ability

adversely influence jurors' opinions about a defendant, Justice Kennedy stated:
If the State cannot render the defendant competent without involuntary
medication, then it must resort to civil commitment, if appropriate, unless the
defendant becomes competent through other means. If the defendant cannot be
tried without his behavior and demeanor being affected in this substantial way by
involuntary treatment, in my view the Constitution requires that society bear this
cost in order to preserve the integrity of the trial process. The state of our
knowledge of antipsychotic drugs and their side effects is evolving and may one
day produce effective drugs that have only minimal side effects. Until that day
comes, we can permit their use only when the State can show that involuntary
treatment does not cause alterations raising the concerns enumerated in this
separate opinion.
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 145 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
Given the frequency with which legal briefs and case law have quoted Justice
Kennedy's just-described views, it is interesting to note the brevity of Sell's entire
comments about currently available antipsychotic medications: "Different kinds of
antipsychotic drugs may produce different side effects and enjoy different levels of
success." Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. For a discussion of this matter as it existed in 2002, see
Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the "Chemical Straitjacket": The Legal Significance of
Recent Advances in the Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
1033, 1139-49 (2002).
77.
Sell, 539 U.S. at 179.
78.
Id. at 180.
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to assist defense counsel. 79 Third, a trial court must find that no less
intrusive treatment would restore the defendant's competence. 80 Finally,
Sell allows involuntary medication only if the trial court determines that
such treatment would be "medically appropriate," i.e., in the patient's best
medical interest in light of his medical condition.,,81
79.
Id. at 181.
80.
1d. This requirement deserves two parenthetical comments. Sell states that before
ordering involuntary medication, trial courts must find "that any alternative, less intrusive
treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results" as would medication. 1d.
(emphasis added). Sell then contrasts the claim made by the American Psychological
Association (in its amicus brief) that "nondrug therapies may be effective in restoring
psychotic defendants to competence," with psychiatrists' assertion (in the amicus brief filed
by the American Psychiatric Association and American Academy of Psychiatry and the
Law) that "alternative treatments for psychosis [are] commonly not as effective as
medication." ld.
Sell thus implies that virtually any nonpharmacological therapy is "less intrusive" than
taking drugs. But is this really so? Assume that a defendant charged with assaulting a police
officer suffers from fixed delusional beliefs about the legal system: he thinks that local law
enforcement agencies, the local judiciary, the prosecutor's office, and all defense attorneys
are conspiring against him in a plot to have him imprisoned so that they can proceed
uninhibited to tum his wife and daughters into prostitutes. The defendant-patient has two
treatment options: (1) having a "therapist" meet with him an hour several times a week
(perhaps for months) with the express purpose of getting the defendant to see that his beliefs
are preposterous, or (2) having a psychiatrist or nurse administer a medication for a few
moments once a day, watching carefully for any side effects, but allowing the defendantpatient to revise his opinions as he wishes. Why would medication be necessarily "more
intrusive" than months of govemment-induced therapeutic indoctrination?
Sell also states that trial courts "must consider less intrusive means for administering
the drugs, e.g., a court order to the defendant backed by the contempt power, before
considering more intrusive methods," where "more intrusive methods" presumably refers to
injections or medication. 1d. This is curious. What conceivable persuasive effect could a
contempt citation have on a defendant, given that the defendant would already be charged
with a serious crime and involuntarily hospitalized? Former APA president Paul S.
Appelbaum suggests this idea may reflect the Supreme Court's poor grasp of

the realities of severe mental illness ....
. . . For a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court to suggest that a psychotic, treatmentrefusing defendant, found incompetent to stand trial and already confined in a
prison medical facility would agree to take medication because a judge threatened
to hold him in contempt bespeaks a remarkably optimistic view of judicial power
- and a serious lack of appreciation of the nature of psychosis.
Paul S. Appelbaum, Treating Incompetent Defendants: The Supreme Court's Decision Is a
Tough Sell, 54 PSYCHIATRY SERVo 1335, 1336 (2003).
81.
Id. Justice Breyer then recommends that, before considering forced medication for
adjudicatory competence, trial courts should first determine whether forcing medication is
needed to address the individual's dangerousness and whether the individual is competent to
make decisions about medication. He sees determinations of dangerousness as "more
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IV. DEFINING "MEDICALLY APPROPRIATE"

What, then, should testifying experts-and the trial court judges who
hear their testimony-consider when offering opinions about whether a
treatment is "medically appropriate"? By itself, the Supreme Court's justquoted phrase suggests that a trial judge need only find out whether
clinicians think administering medication is the right way to treat the
condition82 that they have diagnosed. Doctors 83 who might testify about
'objective and manageable'" and easier for medical experts "than the inquiry into whether
medication is permissible to render a defendant competent." Sell, 539 U.S. at 181-82,
quoting Riggins, 504 U.S. at 140 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Moreover, courts
are accustomed to instituting guardianship for persons who lack capacity to make medical
decisions. "If a court authorizes medication on these alternative grounds," concludes Justice
Breyer, "the need to consider authorization on trial competence grounds will likely
disappear." Sell, 539 U.S. at 182-83.
Concerning this portion of the Sell opinion, Appelbaum comments, "Even granting the
Court's unfamiliarity with several generations of research that demonstrate the frustration of
trying to predict who will be violent, the record of this case itself should have suggested that
such prognostication is no simple matter." After describing the divergent opinions about
Sell's dangerousness offered by treating clinicians, lower courts, and Justice Breyer himself,
Appelbaum states, "Given this record, it should have been obvious to the Court that
determining dangerousness is typically neither 'objective' nor particularly 'manageable.'"
Appelbaum, supra note 80, at 1336.
82.
This Article uses the word "condition" to designate the broad array of medical
problems (psychiatric and nonpsychiatric) for which persons may seek treatment. See
WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 358 (1951) (first defmition of "condition" is "state of being; situation in
relation to ... ' physical or mental soundness"). Although many sources list the words
"disease" and "disorder" as synonyms (see, e.g., id. at 498), "disease" has a connotation of
physical alteration ("any morbid state of the body generally, or of any particular organ or
part of the body," id. at 497), whereas "disorder" connotes disruption of function ("[w]ant of
order or regular disposition" ... "[i]rregularity, disturbance or interruption of the functions
of the animal economy," id. at 501-02), including mental functioning ("[d]iscomposure of
the mind; turbulence of passions," id. at 502). Although legal sources (e.g., many states'
insanity statutes) refer to mental "diseases" and "defects," U.S. psychiatric manuals have,
for the last half-century, referred to mental ailments as "disorders," DSM-IV-TR, supra note
24, at xxv-xxvi, and the current diagnostic manual defines "mental disorder" as disruption in
various forms of functioning, id. at xxxi. DSM-IV-TR uses the term "general medical
condition" to refer to those ailments listed outside the "Mental and Behavioural Disorders"
section of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health
Problems. Id. at xxxv.
83.
As of this writing, only two states-Louisiana and New Mexico--permit
psychologists to prescribe psychotropic medications. Elsewhere, this is a privilege reserved
primarily for physicians, and thus psychiatrists usually would be the only professionals
likely to be viewed as having appropriate expertise on this topic. The appellate record in Sell
shows, however, that the federal magistrate and district court judge considered the opinion
of Dr. DeMier, a psychologist, in their decisions to authorize involuntary medication. See
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such matters would only need to consider this narrow issue, applying what
I shall call a "right-treatment-for-the-condition" approach, when
formulating their conceptualization opinions. This approach is reflected in
the above-quoted conclusion of Dr. Daniel,84 and is typical of discussions
that appear in medical textbooks: a disease's signs and symptoms are
described, techniques for diagnosing the disease are explained, and the
disease's treatments are discussed.
The appellate ruling in Weston exemplifies this right-treatment-for-thecondition interpretation of what counts toward deciding that competencerestoring treatment is "medically appropriate." In discussing treating
Russell Weston with antipsychotic medication, the D.C. Court of Appeals
wrote,
Whether a proposed course of action is "medically appropriate"
obviously depends on the judgment of medical professionals .... The
district court relied on several experts in concluding that "antipsychotic
medication is the medically acceptable and indicated treatment for
Weston's illness." ...
The district court measured the medical appropriateness of
antipsychotic medication by examining the capacity of antipsychotic
drugs to alleviate Weston's schizophrenia (the medical benefits) against
their capacity to produce harm (the medical costs, or side effects) ....
Numerous experts testified that antipsychotic medication is the
medically appropriate treatment for Weston's illness .... While there
are potential side effects, ... the professional jUdgment of the medical
experts was that "each of these potential side effects is generally
manageable." ... The short of the matter is that the record leaves no
basis for doubting the district court's conclusion that antipsychotic
medication is the medically appropriate treatment for Weston's
condition. 85

Yet examination of Sell suggests that deciding whether a treatment is
"medically appropriate" may require a broader view. When considering
whether to force medications on a criminal defendant, Sell instructs trial
courts to first ask whether involuntary treatment is needed because the
defendant's "refusal to take drugs puts his health gravely at risk," or is
involuntary treatment "medically appropriate and necessary to control a
patient's potentially dangerous behavior (or to avoid serious harm to the

Appellant Brief, supra note 49, at 14.
84.
See supra text at notes 36-40.
85.
United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 876-77 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted).
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patient himself).,,86 Even when the answers to these questions are negative,
the findings underlying such a decision will help to infonn expert
opinion and judicial decisionmaking in respect to a request to
administer drugs for trial competence purposes. At the least, they will
facilitate direct medical and legal focus upon such questions as: Why is
it medically appropriate forcibly to administer antipsychotic drugs to an
individual who (1) is not dangerous and (2) is competent to make up his
own mind about treatment? Can bringing such an individual to trial
alone justify in whole (or at least in significant part) administration of a
drug that may have adverse side effects, including side effects that may
to some extent impair a defense at trial?87

This paragraph from Sell clearly suggests that, to determine the medical
appropriateness of a particular drug regimen, a trial court should consider
more than whether the drug will alleviate symptoms and whether the
benefit of relieving symptoms outweighs the potential side effects that the
drug might directly, physically induce. 88 Before deciding that forced
treatment of a defendant is "medically appropriate," a trial court must also
consider, at the very least, the defendant's health, his safety, and whether
the Government's interest in prosecution justifies subjecting the defendant
to the effects of medication. At most hearings on forced medication, the
principal source of information and opinion on these topics will be the
testimony of physicians. 89

86.
Sell v. U.S, 539 U.S. 166, 182 (2003).
87.
ld. at 183.
88.
By the phrase "side effects that the medication might directly, physically cause," I
refer to movement abnormalities, sedation, clouding of thinking, and other side effects that
any individual might experience when undergoing treatment. I wish to emphasis a
distinction between such "directly, physically" caused side effects and the "side effect" of
eligibility for prosecution, which is not a physical result of medication, but a consequence of
what medication makes legally permissible.
89.
That psychiatrists will need to address these matters is anticipated by Sell's
comment that
the inquiry into whether medication is permissible, say, to render an individual
nondangerous is usually more "objective and manageable" than the inquiry into
whether medication is permissible to render a defendant competent. . .. The
medical experts may find it easier to provide an informed opinion about whether,
given the risk of side effects, particular drugs are medically appropriate and
necessary to control a patient's potentially dangerous behavior (or to avoid serious
harm to the patient himself) than to try to balance harms and benefits related to the
more quintessentially legal questions of trial fairness and competence.

ld. at 182, citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 140 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
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A. "Medically Appropriate": Legal Interpretations

In seeking clarification about what counts when considering whether a
proposed treatment is "medically appropriate," courts and experts might
turn, among other places, to other cases that use the phrase. There is no
shortage of these. A June 24, 2004 search of the Lexis "Federal & State
Cases, Combined" database using the strategy "MEDICA! PREll
90
APPROPRIAT!" yielded 755 cases. It is beyond the scope of this Article to
review all these occurrences, so I have chosen a few instances that
represent the variety of uses to which case law puts this phrase.
1.

Supreme Court Cases

The phrase "medically appropriate" appears in four U.S. Supreme Court
cases besides Sell, three of which involve individuals with mental
disabilities. 91 In Riggins, the majority decided to "presume" that giving the
defendant the antipsychotic drug Mellaril had been "medically appropriate"
because, "[a]lthough defense counsel stressed that Riggins received a very
high dose of the drug, at no point did he suggest to the Nevada courts that
administration of Mellaril was medically improper treatment for his
client."n Here, then, "medically appropriate" seems to refer only to
whether the drug was the right type of medication for the patient's
condition.
The phrase occurs twice in Harper. In the first occurrence, the majority
uses the "right-treatment-for-the-condition" interpretation to address the
dissent's contention that prison procedures would permit involuntarily
administering medication
without reference to whether the treatment is medically appropriate ....
For various reasons, we disagree. That an inmate is mentally ill and
dangerous is a necessary condition to medication, but not a sufficient
condition; before the hearing committee determines whether these
requirements are met, the inmate's treating physician must first make

90.
The phrase "medically appropriate" appears in 517 cases. Other hits included
phrases such as "medical appropriateness," which appears twice in Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
91.
The nonpsychiatric case is Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S.
490 (1989) (holding constitutional provisions of a Missouri law prohibiting public
employees and facilities from performing abortions unless they were necessary to save the
mother's life, and barring public funds, employees, and facilities from being used to counsel
a woman to have an abortion not needed to save her life). Dissenting, Justice Blackmun
construed a portion of the law in question merely to "instruct[] the physician to make a
finding of viability using tests to determine gestational age, weight, and lung maturity when
such tests are feasible and medically appropriate." Id. at 545 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
92.
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133.
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the decision that medication is appropriate. 93

The phrase's second OCCurrence in Harper, however, incorporates a
result of medication that goes beyond controlling a patient's psychotic
symptoms, viz., "the legitimate governmental interest in treating him where
medically appropriate for the purpose of reducing the danger he poses.,,94
The U.S. Supreme Court's third use of the phrase "medically
appropriate" appears in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Olmstead v.
L. C. ,95 a 1999 ruling that addresses the rights of two institutionalized
patients, under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),96 to
placement in community treating settings. 97 Concerning the patients,
Justice Kennedy writes that "it is undisputed that the State's own treating
professionals determined that community-based care was medically
appropriate for respondents.,,98 After emphasizing that persons with severe
mental problems often need inpatient care and deteriorate in the community
because they do not take medication, Justice Kennedy opines that "[t]he
opinion of a responsible treating physician in determining the appropriate
conditions for treatment ought to be given the greatest of deference.,,99
Here, then, the phrase "medically appropriate" addresses matters that go
beyond the psychotropic drugs that psychiatrists prescribe, and
encompasses a doctor's judgments about where a patient should live and
receive psychopharmacological treatment.
2.

Disputes about Reimbursement

A large fraction of the "medically appropriate" cases involve disputes
between parties who desire treatments or services provided by physicians
and the parties who have to pay for such services. In these cases,
"medically appropriate" typically designates a treatment or service that
doctors - applying the "right-treatment-for-the-condition" model recommend, but that the payor wishes not to reimburse. IOO Since the

Harper, 494 U.S. at 223 n.8.
ld. at 226.
95. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
96.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.
97. The main thrust of the decision is that, under Title II of the ADA, states must
place persons with mental disabilities in community settings rather than in institutions when
the state's treating professionals believe that community placement is appropriate, the
patient accepts outpatient placement, and "the placement can be reasonably accommodated,
taking into account the resources available to the state and the needs of others with mental
disabilities." Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587.
98.
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 609 (Kennedy, 1., concurring).
99.
ld. at 610.
100.
When I performed this search, the most recent such example was Erringer v.
93.
94.
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landmark Wickline decision, )0) physicians have been gravely concerned
about the influence of third-party payors on what were once sovereign
medical decisions. A portion of the California Professional and Business
Code (which explicitly responds to Wickline) attempts to restrict decisionmaking to physicians by declaring that "medically appropriate" hospital
care "shall be defined by the hospital medical staff and approved by the
governing body, consistent with that degree of learning and skill ordinarily
possessed by reputable ~hysicians practicing according to the applicable
legal standard of care.") 2 The Code encourages doctors "to advocate for
medically appropriate health care" by appealing "a payor's decision to
deny payment for a service pursuant to the [established] reasonable
grievance or appeal procedure.,,)03
Sometimes the uses of "medically appropriate" get stretched in these
cases, even if the argument is about payment. An example is found in
Barnett v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, )04 a suit brought by a man who
had hepatitis and sought treatment at Kaiser-Sacramento Medical Center.
Barnett's doctor investigated the option of a liver transplant and consulted
informally with the medical group's liver specialists, but decided the
transplant "was not medically appropriate.") 05 Barnett paid for the
transplant himself, then sued to recover his medical expenses. The Court of
Appeals found in Kaiser's favor, holding that medical criteria are an
appropriate way to make allocation decisions about such resources. In this
instance, the use of "medically appropriate" plainly goes beyond righttreatment-for-the-condition -liver transplants are the treatment for terminal
liver failure - to include the essentially ethical issue of when payment for
very expensive treatments may be denied.
3.

Other Varieties of Cases

"Medically appropriate" appears, and takes on varying meanings, in
other types of cases. In R.A.J. v. Miller, \06 a case dealing with the right of a
civilly committed psychiatric inpatient to withhold consent to the
Thompson, No. 03-16408, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 11432, at *7 (9th Cir. June 10, 2004)
(discussing regulations for Medicare coverage ofa contractor's services).
101.
Wickline v. State of California, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630 (1986) (holding that the
decision to discharge a patient, and responsibility for the consequences thereof, were the
treating physician's, notwithstanding Medi-Cal's agreeing to pay for a four-day extension of
hospitalization, rather than the eight days that doctors had requested).
\02.
CAL. PROF. & Bus. CODE § 2056(e).
103.
CAL. PROF. & Bus. CODE § 2056(b). These portions of the Code are cited in
Khajavi v. Feather River Anesthesia Medical Group, 84 Cal. App. 4th 32, 43 (2000).
104.
32 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 1994).
105.
Id. at 415.
106.
590 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Tex. 1984).·
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administration of psychotropic medication, plaintiffs argued that
competent, committed patients had the right to refuse treatment, proposed a
rule for administration over a patient's refusal, and convinced the court to
accept this rule. The rule included a requirement that treatment be
"medically appropriate," meaning
that without such medication the patient's condition cannot realistically
be expected to improve within a reasonable period of time; or that
without such medication deterioration of the patient's condition cannot
be prevented; or that without such medication there is a significant
possibility that the patient's mental condition will not be stabilized in
time to prevent injury to himself or other persons ...
The administration of psychotropic medication may be continued if the
Clinical Director or his physician designee determines that the
administration of such medication is medically appropriate treatment. In
making this determination, the clinical director or his physician
designee will consider the following factors:
(A) the accuracy ofthe diagnosis;
(B) indications for the medication;
(C) probable benefits and risks of the medication; and
(D) the existence and value of alternative forms of treatment, if
any. 107

The second portion of this rule defines "medically appropriate" along
right-treatment-for-the-condition lines. The first portion, however, takes
into account what a patient might do to others if not treated.
Cases outside psychiatric contexts sometimes use "medically
appropriate" to point to issues concerning the safety of third parties. Vega
v. SielaJj08 concerned the opening of a jail that (along with other persons)
would need to house, and eventually release, potentially contagious
individuals with HIV or AIDS. Individuals quoted in the case discuss "the
need to find medically appropriate housing for contagious patients
immediately" and "the release of contagious patients, . .. [which] might
well be medically appropriate if the patients were being sent home where
their families had already been exposed to them.,,109

107.

108.
1990).
109.

!d. at 1323-24.
No. 82 Civ. 6475(MEL), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19427 (S.D. N.Y. May 22,
Id.at*8,10.
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Bruno v. State 1\0 concerns a provision in Florida law that permits a
criminal court to "sentence" individuals convicted of sexual battery to
"treatment" with medroxyprogesterone acetate lll following a medical
examination. Florida law requires the State's Department of Corrections to
provide the services necessary to administer the drug, but does not "require
the continued administration of medroxyprofesterone acetate (MPA)
treatment when it is not medically appropriate.,,1 2
Perhaps the most curious case-law occurrence of the phrase "medically
appropriate"-used in a context that has nothing to do with any particular
medical condition-appears in Campbell v. Wood,l13 a Ninth Circuit
decision upholding the constitutionality of hanging as a method of
execution. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Reinhardt contrasts hanging with
a more medically appropriate method of execution - lethal injection ...
[T]he administration of an injection to a person who has been sedated
and placed on a bed by a medically trained person in a medical
environment is obviously far less barbaric and uncivilized, far less
inhumane and degrading, than the forced march of a prisoner up the
gallows steps where the untrained hangman waits in hope that the drop
will be spoiled only by the defecation and voiding that result from the
state's crude and violent effort to forcefully terminate a human life at
the end of a rope. 114

4.

Psychiatric Patients and Criminal Cases

Returning our attention to criminal cases involving psychiatric patients,
one finds many instances in which the phrase reflects a court's judgment
only about the direct physical effects of psychotropic medication,
110.
837 So. 2d 521 (Fla. App. 2003).
111.
Injectable medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) is officially indicated for use as a
long-acting contraceptive; an oral form of MP A is indicated in the treatment of menopausal
symptoms. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2762, 3451 (57 th edition, 2003). However,
"[o]nce a product has been approved for marketing [for any disorder], a physician may
choose to prescribe it for uses or in treatment regimens or patient populations that are not
included in approved labeling .... [A]ccepted medical practice includes drug use that is not
reflected in approved drug labeling." Jd., foreward. Several states now have laws that
mandate, under various circumstances, that sex offenders receive treatment with MPA. This
process, which reduces testosterone levels, is frequently referred to as "chemical castration."
See, e.g., "Is chemical castration an acceptable punishment for male sex offenders?"
available at http://www.csun.eduJ~psy453/crimesy.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2004). For a
recent discussion of androgen-lowering agents and other treatments for pedophilia, see Peter
J. Fagan et a!., Pedophilia, 288 JAMA 2458 (2002).
112.
Bruno, 837 So. 2d at 523, n. 1, quoting FLA. STAT. 794.0235.
113.
18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1994).
114.
Jd. at 702-03 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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irrespective of outside issues. United States v. Williams I 15 provides a recent
example. Before adjudication, the district court had ordered Williams to
take medication for competence-to-stand-trial purposes, noting that the
defendant
"has experienced some lethargy, blurred vision, and dry mouth. He
fears tremors, facial paralysis, and other side effects may follow, and he
is concerned all of the side effects may be long term." Based on
Williams' treating psychiatrist's testimony, the court concluded that the
medication would cause Williams "only minimal, temporary side
effects. The Court finds the medication, therefore, is 'medically
appropriate. ",116
As the district court uses the phrase, medication is "medically
appropriate" because side effects - direct, physical results of the
medication-would be "minimal" and "temporary."
To the appeals court, however, "medical" considerations encompass
more than drugs' physical effects. After Williams regained competence
(while taking medication), he pled guilty to having sent a threatening email message to a teacher at the college where he had been a student. His
proposed sentence included a three-year period of supervised release,
during which the district court required him to continue taking
antipsychotic medication. Williams objected to this requirement on grounds
that it had no adequate basis, and the appeals court vacated the requirement
and remanded it for further proceedings. The appeals court faulted the
district court for failing to "make on-the-record, medically-grounded
findings that court-ordered medication,,,117 which it deemed "an especially
grave infringement of liberty," I 18 would '" involve[] no greater deprivation
of liberty than [waJs reasonably necessary'" for "deterring and protecting
the public from further crimes by Williams." I 19 Here, then, as in Harper,
broader social concerns enter the sphere of matters that require medical
expert opinion.
Other cases reflect similar variations in meaning. State v. Kotis, 120 which
deals with medicating defendants who pose threats to themselves or others,
requires that the proposed treatment be "medically appropriate, that is, in
the defendant's medical interest;" this right-treatment-for-the condition
issue is enumerated separately from whether, "considering less intrusive
alternatives, the treatment is essential to forestall the danger posed by the
115.
116.

117.
118.
119.

120.

356 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2004).
ld. at 1049.
Id.atI057.
ld. at 1055.
ld. at 1052-53, quoting 18 U.S.c. § 3583(d) (emphasis as in Williams).
91 Haw. 319 (1999).
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defendant.,,121
United States v. Gomes,122 the Second Circuit's leading pre-Sell case on
forced competence restoration, takes the right-treatment-for-the-condition
approach endorsed by the D.C. Circuit in Weston:
As part of its inquiry into the medical appropriateness of administering
antipsychotic medication in Gomes's case, the district court
appropriately considered the expert's diagnosis of the defendant's
mental illness .... The government offered the testimony of Gomes's
treating psychiatrist at USMC-Springfield, Dr. Wolfson, who testified
extensively about the likely effects and side effects of both the older and
newer types of antipsychotic medication. Weighing the benefits of this
type of medication against the possible harms, Dr. Wolfson concluded
that medication was appropriate for Gomes. 123

The Eighth Circuit decision that was vacated by the Supreme Court's
Sell ruling states that antipsychotic "[m]edication is medically appropriate
if: (1) it is likely to render the patient competent; (2) the likelihood and
gravity of side effects do not overwhelm its benefits; and, (3) it is in the
best medical interests of the patient.,,124 Although the Eighth Circuit's
formulation looks, on first glance, to be a right-treatment-for-the-condition
approach (it la Gomes), one of the "conditions" to be considered is not a
psychiatric disorder, but instead the patient's incompetence to stand trial.
The Eighth Circuit's Sell decision, like many of the cases we have been
examining, refers to a patient's "medical interest" without further defining
that term. As the term is used by the Eighth Circuit, for a court to conclude
that receiving a drug would be in a patient's "medical interest" appears
only to require a finding that the drug is the right treatment for the patient's
mental disorder. In other words, the court would consider the direct
physical effects of the proposed drug, weighing its anticipated impact on
the symptoms of the disorder and against the drug's possible adverse
effects; if the prospects for symptoms alleviation were clearly greater than
the expected adverse effects, the court would find such treatment in the
patient's medical interest. That a patient's "medical interest" is
distinguishable from the personal, social, or legal consequences of
treatment is made clear by the Eighth Circuit having listed, as a separate
consideration, the potential capacity of medication to make patientdefendants eligible for prosecution.
In sharp contrast is the Louisiana Supreme Court's use of the phrases

121.
122.
123.
124.

Jd. at 334.
289 F.3d 71 (2nd Cir. 2002).
Jd. at 86 (citations to Weston and Harper omitted).
United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 567 (8th Cir. 2002).
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"medical interest" and "medically appropriate" in State v. Perry,125 which
considered whether a psychotic death row inmate could be involuntarily
medicated to render him competent to be executed. 126 In concluding that
such treatment was impermissible, Perry held that "[d]rugging [f]or
[e]xecution" would be "[p]unishment, [n]ot [m]edical [t]reatment," 127
despite (actually, because of) the fact that the medication would alleviate
the disabling impact 128 of a severe mental disorder. After quoting portions

125.
610 So.2d 746 (La. 1992).
Common law has long recognized that individuals must be competent to be
126.
executed. Perry, 610 So.2d at 749. In Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,409-10 (1986), the
U.S. Supreme Court declared, as a matter of constitutional law , that "the Eighth Amendment
prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane." Ford
did not address whether death row inmates may be involuntarily medicated to restore their
competence for execution. Perry and Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993), are the
two state supreme court cases that say they may not; Singleton v. Norris, 319 F .3d 10 18 (8th
Cir. 2003), held that they may.
127.
Perry, 610 So.2d at 752.
128.
The plurality opinion in Ford v. Wainwright did not establish a constitutional
standard for determining whether a prisoner is incompetent to be executed, but Justice
Powell's concurrence addressed this issue: "I would hold that the Eighth Amendment
forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to
suffer and why they are to suffer it." Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, 1., concurring). Justice
Powell thought that Alvin Ford met this standard. Id. That Justice Powell's criterion implies
a severe degree of disability is demonstrated by the description, in the plurality opinion, of
Ford's clinical course several years after his conviction:
In early 1982, ... Ford began to manifest gradual changes in behavior. They
began as an occasional peculiar idea or confused perception, but became more
serious over time. After reading in the newspaper that the Ku Klux Klan had held
a rally in nearby Jacksonville, Florida, Ford developed an obsession focused upon
the Klan. His letters to various people reveal endless brooding about his "Klan
work," and an increasingly pervasive delusion that he had become the target of a
complex conspiracy, involving the Klan and assorted others, designed to force
him to commit suicide. He believed that the prison guards, part of the conspiracy,
had been killing people and putting the bodies in the concrete enclosures used for
beds. Later, he began to believe that his women relatives were being tortured and
sexually abused somewhere in the prison. This notion developed into a delusion
that the people who were tormenting him at the prison had taken members of
Ford's family hostage. The hostage delusion took firm hold and expanded, until
Ford was reporting that 135 of his friends and family were being held hostage in
the prison, and that only he could help them. By "day 287" of the "hostage crisis,"
the list of hostages had expanded to include "senators, Senator Kennedy, and
many other leaders." ... In a letter to the Attorney General of Florida, written in
1983, Ford appeared to assume authority for ending the "crisis," claiming to have
fired a number of prison officials. He began to refer to himself as "Pope John
Paul, III," and reported having appointed nine new justices to the Florida Supreme
Court ....
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of the Hippocratic Oath in which a physician pledges to prescribe "for the
good of my patients," to "never do harm," to not "prescribe a deadly drug,"
and to act "only for the good of my patients,,,129 Perry states:
Medical treatment does not consist merely of dispensing drugs; other
ingredients are essential to the healing arts. The Hippocratic Oath,
dating from the fifth century B.c., is the seminal source of the
principles of medical ethics and the goals of medical treatment. Under
the oath, the physician pledges to do no harm and to act only in the best
medical interests of his patients. Consequently, medical treatment
cannot occur when the state orders a physician to administer
antipsychotic drugs to an insane prisoner in an attempt to render him
competent for execution.
Because the physician is required by his oath both to alleviate suffering
and to do no harm, the state's order forces him to act unethically and
contrary to the goals of medical treatment. If any physician administers
the drugs forcibly and thereby enables the state to have the inmate
declared competent for execution, the doctor knowingly handles the
prisoner harmfully and contrary to his ultimate medical interest. 130

Perry then notes that to not give the inmate treatment would perpetuate a
type of suffering that physicians ordinarily feel obligated to diminish.131
Yet under a "forcible medicate-to-execute structure," a physician must
"serve two masters," the state and the patient, and this generates "a
substantial concern that the patient's well-being may be subordinated to the
duty the doctor owes the state.,,132 In contrast to Harper, where the state's

Ford told [a psychiatrist] that "I know there is some sort of death penalty, but I'm
free to go whenever 1 want because it would be illegal and the executioner would
be executed." ... When asked if he would be executed, Ford replied: "I can't be
executed because of the landmark case. 1 won. Ford v. State will prevent
executions all over."... These statements appeared amidst long streams of
seemingly unrelated thoughts in rapid succession .... The following month, in an
interview with his attorneys, Ford regressed further into nearly complete
incomprehensibility, speaking only in a code characterized by intermittent use of
the word "one," making statements such as "Hands one, face one. Mafia one. God
one, father one, Pope one. Pope one. Leader one."

Ford, 477 U.S. at 402-03. For another description of the severity of illness in an executionincompetent inmate, see Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1030-33 (Loken, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
129.
Perry, 610 So.2d at 752, quoting STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 647 (4th
Unabridged Lawyer's ed. 1976).
130.
Perry, 610 So.2d at 752.

131.
132.

Id.
Id.
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interests coincided with the patient's medical needs as determined by
doctors, medicating Perry could not be justified legally as being in Perry's
medical interest "because forcible administration of drugs to implement
execution is not medically appropriate.,,133
Perry thus stands clearly for the notions that (1) the potential for a
treatment to make possible a legal outcome is a factor in calculating
whether that treatment is in a patient's "ultimate medical interest," and (2)
considerations of what a physician may ethically do may affect what
treatment a court may legally order.
5.

Conflict Between Statutes and Medical Appropriateness

In the Matter of Baby "K,,134 raised the issue of whether doctors and
hospitals could be required by statute to provide care that they deemed
medically inappropriate. The case evolved from a disagreement between
doctors at a Virginia hospital and the mother of an infant born with
anencephaly, a congenital condition in which large portions of the brain
and skull are missing. Because she lacked cerebral hemispheres, Baby K
would never see, hear, interact with her environment, or attain
consciousness. However, her brainstem supported autonomic functions and
reflexes. Because of difficulty breathing on her own at birth, Baby K's
physicians placed her on a mechanical ventilator. They then discussed the
infant's grim prognosis with her mother and recommended that aggressive
treatment measures - including continued ventilatory support - be
discontinued, though supportive measures such as providing nutrition and
warmth would continue.u s Baby K's mother disagreed, however, and
insisted that her daughter receive mechanical ventilation whenever she had
trouble breathing on her own. Baby K was eventually weaned from a
respirator and transferred to a nursing home, but was brought back to the
hospital's emergency department three times when her breathing problems
recurred. Each time, the hospital admitted Baby K and placed her back on a
ventilator. After the second admission, however, the hospital went to
federal court seeking a declaration that it was not required to provide such
aggressive treatment. 136
In making this request, the hospital was, in effect, seeking a way around
obligations created by the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and

ld. at 754.
134. 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994). For a more detailed discussion of this case, and the
national attention that it received, see Heather Tierney, Conjoined Twins: The Conflict
Between Parents and the Courts Over the Medical Treatment o/Children, 30 DENY. J. INT'L
L. & POL'y 458, 467-71 (2002).
135.
Baby "K," 16 F.3d at 592.
136.
ld. at 593.
133.
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Active Labor Act. 137 EMTALA requires, among other things, that a patient
coming to an emergency department receive screening for any lifethreatening, "emergency medical condition;,,138 if such a condition is
present, the hospital must at least provide enough treatment to assure that
the patient will not deteriorate while being transferred to another facility.139
Each time Baby K had come to the hospital, her breathing problems had
been life-threatening, and because no other facility that could treat Baby K
would accept her as a patient, the hospital appeared to have no choice,
under EMTALA, other than to continue to ventilate her until she could
breath independently. 140 The hospital argued, however, that this
interpretation of EMTALA failed to accommodate a provision in Virginia's
Health Care Decisions Act stating that nothing in the act could "require a
physician to prescribe or render medical treatment to a patient that the
physician determines to be medically or ethically inappropriate.,,141
Both the district court 142 and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
with the mother, however. To the extent that the Virginia statute conflicted
with EMTALA, the federal law's requirements preempted provisions of the
state law. 143 On "a straightforward application" of EMTALA, Baby K's
respiratory distress was indeed an emergency condition, and when she
arrived at the hospital for care, the hospital was legally obligated to provide
treatment adequate to stabilize her condition. 144 "We recognize the
dilemma facing physicians who are requested to provide treatment they
consider morally and ethically inappropriate," wrote the appeals court, "but
we cannot ignore the plain language of the statute. .. The apwopriate
branch to redress the policy concerns of the Hospital is Congress." 45
B. "Medically Appropriate": Medical Uses
A June 22, 2004 search of the "MEDLINE" database 146 revealed 72
occurrences of the phrase "medically appropriate." In most instances,
context implies that the phrase points to a behavior, decision, or form of

137.

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd.
138. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(a).
139.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A).
140.
Baby "K," 16 F.3d at 594.
14l. VA.CODEANN.§54.1-2990.
142.
In the Matter ofBaby "K, " 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993).
143.
Baby "K," 16 F.3d at 597.
144.
Id. at 594-95.
145.
Id. at 596.
146. MEDLINE ® is a bibliographic database of medical journals that contains titles,
authors, and abstracts (but not the full text) of articles dating back to 1966. See
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/pubs/factsheets/medline.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
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therapy that is "right" or optimal according to some criterion that takes into
account just the patient's medical condition. For example, the earliest
instance is a 1980 article examining whether a physician-prepared triage
algorithm would allow nonphysicians to assign military patients to various
categories of need, including a category of ailments addressable through
"medically appropriate self-care protocOIS.,,147 A similar use occurs in an
article that deems prenatal alpha-fetoprotein screening to be "medically
appropriate for diabetic women" because of the test's effectiveness in
detecting fetal neural tube defects during early pregnancy. 148
In several abstracts, "medically appropriate" is used to contrast an
idealized state of affairs-in which the only issue governing medical
decisions is whether a proposed treatment is the right one for the patient's
condition-with the 'real world,' where doctors and hospitals respond to
financial incentives and drugs, and medical procedures have to be paid for.
For example, a 1985 article notes that because of then-recent changes in
Medicare reimbursement patterns,
the clinical laboratory needs to find ways to maintain the quality of its
service while operating more profitably. Many laboratories have
decided to focus on reducing the volume of testing. How effective and
medically appropriate is this approach, and what are the altematives?149

A 1990 article notes that three common, invasive gastrointestinal and
vascular procedures often "were performed for reasons that were less than
medically appropriate," and that getting care from a surgeon who did many
carotid endarterectomies "decreased the likelihood of an appropriate
endarterectomy by one third.,,150 In a 1995 article, a pediatrician
admonishes his colleagues:
The ethical practice of medicine in a managed care environment
involves providing care at a level that avoids high cost with poor
outcomes .... Purchasers of health care today are clear about what they
want-low cost, convenient access for their employees, medically
appropriate, documented treatment, and patient satisfaction-and they

147. P. B. Vaughn et ai., Effective Algorithm-based Triage and Self-care Protocols:
Quality Medicine at Lower Costs, 9 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 31 (1980).
148. A. Milunsky and E. Alpert, Results and Benefits of a Maternal Serum Alphafetoprotein Screening Program, 252 JAMA 1438 (1984). In diabetic women, the rate of
neural tube defects was 7.6 times higher than the rate for nondiabetic women, for whom the
authors thought screening should be a "voluntary option." Id.
149.
1. W. Winkelman and L. H. Bernstein, The Unordered Test: Cost of the Benefit vs.
Benefit of the Cost, 39 PATHOLOGIST 12 (July 1985).
150. R. H. Brook et ai., Predicting the Appropriate Use of Carotid Endarterectomy,
Upper Gastrointestinal Endoscopy, and Coronary Angiography, 323 NEW ENGL. J. MED.
1173 (1990).
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are clear about how they intend to get what they want. lSI

A physician and medical consultant for Blue CrosslBlue Shield l52 provides
what may be the best short summary of how the term "medically
appropriate" functions in policy decisions about medical coverage:
Over the years the concept of medical necessity has evolved to
encompass a multitude of medical management strategies. Essentially,
in terms of the contract language, medical necessity has become a
workhorse concept to determine coverage eligibility. In the process, the
interpretation of the term has taken on various guises, [including] ...
[d]etermining whether the proposed therapy is medically appropriate for
the patient's condition[.]
Most definitions of medical necessity in health plan contracts include
some sort of statement regarding medical appropriateness. While this
term merely seems to substitute the vague term "necessary" for the
equally obscure term "appropriate," in practice the concept of medical
appropriateness often includes determining whether the service in
question is appro~riate for the individual, given the patient's unique set
of circumstances. 53

Often implicit in discussions about reimbursement are moral questions
about whether doctors can remain devoted to their patients' welfare - doing
what is "medically appropriate"-and, at the same time, respond to
demands of third-party payors. Ethical considerations become the focus in
another, not infrequent use of the phrase, when "medically appropriate"
points to actions or decisions that incorporate considerations beyond what
disease(s) a patient has and what treatment(s) might address the disease(s).
In one of several articles she has written on the subject, bioethicist Ruth
Macklin concludes that using growth hormone to increase the height of
very short children is "medically appropriate" not because such children
have a disease (often, determining whether they do is difficult), but because
of their potential suffering. 154 Cardiopulmonary resuscitation is the correct
151.
Henry E. Golembesky, How to Integrate Your Practice into the New Health Care
System, 96 PEDIATRICS 866 (1995).
152.
See Dr. Brown's listing at http://www.cancemetwork.comllibraryIMCCboard.htm
(last visited Nov. 23,2004).
153.
Elizabeth Brown, Medically Necessary?, 25 PHYSICIAN EXEC. 74 (MarlApr 1999).
154.
R. Macklin, Growth Hormone in Short Children: Medically Appropriate
Treatment, 90 ACTA PAEDIATR. 5 (2001). Dr. Macklin notes, however, that "there are
several problems with using" alleviation of suffering as the "approach to determine
appropriateness of administering GH [growth hormone] to children, including knowing
whether shortness really will cause the child (as opposed to his parents) to suffer, and
balancing the possible suffering shortness would cause with the real suffering that years of
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treatment for cardiac arrest, but Dr. Gordon Snider concludes that "[i]f
CPR does not offer even a modicum of lasting benefit, it is not medically
appropriate to administer the treatment.,,155 In discussing a physician
training program for end-of-life care, family practitioner Richard
Ackermann notes, "Withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining therapies is
ethical and medically appropriate in some circumstances.,,156 All these
instances of "medically appropriate" evince the viewpoint urged by Joseph
Fletcher in his seminal text, Morals and Medicine, that ethical medical care
is about more than treating disorders:
As Dr. Francis Peabody of the Boston City Hospital once told the
Harvard medical students, "One of the essential qualities of the clinician
is interest in humanity, for the secret of the care of the patient is in
caring for the patient .... The treatment of a disease may be entirely
impersonal; the care of a patient must be completely personal." The
moralist's interest in the ethics of medicine has to do with the care of a
patient, not with the treatment of the disease. Weare concerned with
medical care rather than with medical treatment .... [A] patient's
moral and ethical rights and interests must weigh as heavily in the
medical scales as his physical needs and condition[.]157

C.

"Medically Appropriate": Conclusion

This sampling of legal and medical literature suggests that most often,
using the phrase "medically appropriate" signifies that a procedure or drug
is the right way to diagnose, monitor, or treat a particular medical
condition, without regard to the wishes or social circumstances of the
person whq has that condition. This may well be because usually,
identifying and treating a medical condition are activities consonant with
the patient's expressed or reasonably inferred desires, the patient's
legitimate long-term goals (whatever those may be), society's views of
appropriate conduct, and the patient's or a third party's willingness to pay.
Under such circumstances, identifying and treating medical ailments are
activities that raise no moral questions.
Yet when treating a patient's condition has the potential to conflict with

injections will cause. Id. at 6; see also R. Macklin, Is Short Stature a Disease and Does That
Matter?, 8 GROWTH GENET. HORM. 39 (1992).
155.
Gordon L. Snider, The Do-Nat-Resuscitate Order: Ethical and Legal Imperative
or Medical Decision?, 143 AM. REv. RESPIR. DIS. 665 (1991).
156.
Richard 1. Ackermann, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-sustaining Treatment,
62 AM. F AM. PHYSICIAN 1555 (2000) (summarizing the AMA's Education for Physicians on
End-of-life Care curriculum module on withholding or withdrawing therapy).
157.
JOSEPH FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE 8 (1954), quoting FRANCIS PEABODY,
THE CARE OF THE PATIENT 12,48 (1928) (Fletcher'S italics).
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patients' wishes, social norms, economic pressures, legal requirements, or
moral dictates, "medically appropriate" mayor may not refer merely to
diagnosing and curing ailments. Frequently, "medically appropriate" has a
moral force that directs attention beyond what is convenient or
economically expedient and toward the broad interpersonal or social
obligations that govern physicians' conduct. When asked, in court, whether
a proposed medication is "medically appropriate" for an incompetent
defendant, a psychiatrist could construct an answer that focused merely on
whether the drug would alleviate the patient's symptoms. In doing so,
however, the psychiatrist should recognize that by ignoring the extramedical consequences of treatment-the criminal proceedings that
treatment makes legally allowable-such testimony would betray doctors'
traditional and fundamental concerns for the welfare of patients whom they
treat. The next Part examines how these extra-medical consequences
influenced defense arguments in Sell and Weston, and the potential role that
physician's professional scruples might play in future arguments against
competence restoration.
V. THE SELL AND WESTON CASES:
A. Comparing Defense Arguments Against Medication

The objections raised by Sell's attorneys against involuntaR' medication
were primarily legal ones. They argued, in their merits brief,15 that forcing
their client to take medication would violate his "fundamental right to
'bodily integrity' and to make 'choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy.,,,159 Medication also would implicate Sell's First Amendment
right to freedom of thought and expression because the government's "very
purpose" in treating him was "to change Dr. Sell's thought and speech so
that he does not evidence persecutory delusions.,,160 The government's
interest in prosecuting Sell was not strong enough to override these rights,
said Sell's attorneys, because their client was not dangerous, I 61 and
because civil remedies were available to recoup any losses from their
client's allegedly fraudulent insurance billings. 162
Sell's attorneys also contested the need for and potential efficacy of
antipsychotic medications for their client. No nonpharmacological-and

158.
Reply Brief of Petitioner, Sell v. U.S., 537 U.S. 1186 (2003) (No. 02-5664)
(hereinafter "Sell Merits Brief').
159.
ld. at I, quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851, 857 (1992).
160.
ld. at 4.
161.
ld. at 9.
162.
ld. at 7.
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putatively "less restrictive,,163-attempts had been made to restore Sell's
trial competence. 164 Attorneys also cited psychiatric publications that
described potential side effects of medication and the scientific
disagreements about how well antipsychotic drugs worked in treating
delusional disorder. 165 Finally, said Sell's attorneys, medication might
interfere with their client's capacity to present a diminished capacity
defense, and would violate his right to present a jury with his own version
of events, free of government efforts that could prejudicially "manipulate
his appearance.,,166"
Many of the arguments raised by Sell's attorneys echoed concerns that
attorneys had raised to block forced medication for Russell Weston. In an
April 2001 brief filed with the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, 167 Weston's
lawyers argued that their client, then held in a secure prison hospital, did
not pose an immediate danger to himself or the public, and any danger that
remained was controlled by Weston's being in seclusion. Neuroleptic
medication posed several known risks, and novel antipsychotic agents
might have yet-unknown risks. Antipsychotic drugs could cloud Weston's
thinking or affect his memory of past events. 168
Weston's defense lawyers also argued, as did Sell's attorneys, that
medication might adversely affect their client's ability to mount a
successful mental state defense. Weston's lawyers believed that, as part of
an insanity defense strategy, Weston might need to be delusional during his
criminal trial. That way, jurors could observe him talking, thinking, and
behaving as he did when the shootings occurred; they could see for
themselves that he was genuinely crazy, rather than rely on what expert
witnesses said or videotapes showed. Even if treatment were successful and
free of adverse effects, competence-restoring medication might
permanently change Weston's demeanor and outlook, and he might not
experience a psychotic relapse even if treatment were then withdrawn
before trial. If Weston could not appear in an unmedicated or relapsed state
at trial, it could adversely affect his ability to mount a successful insanity
defense, and this would violate his Sixth Amendment right to undergo trial
in an unmedicated state. 169
But Weston's attorneys raised an additional issue that did not arise in

163.
Related to this assertion, see supra note 80, (discussing relative intrusiveness of
medication and other forms of psychiatric therapy).
164.
Sell Merits Brief, supra note 158, at 10.
165.
/d. at 11,16-17.
166.
Id. at 18.
167.
Brieffor Appellant, supra note 35.
168.
Id.
169.
Id.
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Sell's legal proceedings: whether principles of medical ethics prohibited
Weston's involuntary treatment. Thinking about the appropriateness of
involuntary drug treatment was not simply a matter of whether medication
might ameliorate Weston's symptoms, said Weston's lawyers. Instead,
doctors also had to consider "[t]he context in which the forced medication
issue arises and the stater's] purpose" for the treatment, along with
"alternatives that the government could pursue, such as foregoing
prosecution and seeking civil commitment.,,170 It would be unethical for a
psychiatrist to administer involuntary medication to Weston if, by doing so,
the doctor were acting "solely as an agent of the government.,,171
An additional ethical proscription arose from potential extra-medical
consequences, that is, the possibility that forced medication would "initiate
a chain of circumstances" that could end in Weston's execution. "[A]
psychiatrist treating a pretrial detainee [in a criminal case] is required to
assume that the most negative consequence, from the patient's perspective,
will occur in light of the uncertain outcomes (including uncertain legal
outcomes) that [could] arise" after receiving medication,l72 said Weston's
lawyers. As a result of treatment, Weston might experience a sustained
remission in which he would be competent not only to stand trial, but
remain well enough to undergo execution if he were convicted and
sentenced to death.
[1]f a physician's participation in the forced medication of a pretrial
detainee initiates a chain of circumstances or 'ongoing nexus' resulting
in the person's continued competence to the point of execution, then
such participation in the pretrial context is ethically prohibited ....
[A] treating physician in any case potentially involving the death
penalty must assume that the ongoing nexus will exist to the point of
execution, however unlikely the probabilities may be. 173

VI. THE ETHICAL QUANDARY

All physicians would agree that saying a particular behavior is legal does
not necessarily make that behavior ethical. For example, if a state passed a
law permitting doctors to administer deadly doses of drugs to effect a death
sentence, such behavior would still be expressly banned by the American
Medical Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. 174

170.
171.
172.

173.
174.

ld.
ld.
Brieffor Appellant, supra note 35.
ld.
See AMA CODE OF ETHICS, §E-2.06, which states, in part:
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But many physicians who have commented publicly on the conditions of
Russell Weston or Charles Sell see no ethical barrier to involuntarily
administered treatment for competence restoration, despite the potential
legal consequences. In Weston's case, part of the reason may be that his
psychosis appears to be so pervasive and severe. As Arthur Caplan, who
directs the Center for Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania, put it,
"Keeping him in a florid psychotic condition in seclusion, leaving him as a
stark ravin madman is not good .... It's keeping him alive, but the cost is
absurd.,,17 At the October 2001 Annual Meeting of the American
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, Seymour Halleck-one of many
psychiatrists who had examined Weston at his attorneys' requestexpressed hope that Weston would receive treatment because "he's
suffering.,,176 In a commentary on the Sell decision, former American
Psychiatric Association president Alan Stone articulates an illness-focused
approach:

f

In my view, the most important medical considerations in involuntary
treatment are the patient's diagnosis, severity of illness, nature of
symptoms, and the efficacy and potential side effects of the proposed
medications ....
. . . The legal grounds for [involuntary] treatment [should be] that the

A physician. .. should not be a participant in a legally authorized execution.
Physician participation in execution is defined generally as actions which would
fall into one or more of the following categories: (1) an action which would
directly cause the death of the condemned; (2) an action which would assist,
supervise, or contribute to the ability of another individual to directly cause the
death of the condemned; ...
Physician participation in an execution includes, but is not limited to, the
following actions: prescribing or administering tranquilizers and other
psychotropic agents and medications that are part of the execution procedure; ...
. . . where the method of execution is lethal injection, the following actions by the
physician would also constitute physician participation in execution: selecting
injection sites; starting intravenous lines as a port for a lethal injection device;
prescribing, preparing, administering, or supervising injection drugs or their doses
or types; ...
Available at http://www.ama-assn.orglama/pub/category/84l9.html (last visited Nov. 23,
2004)
175. Hull, supra note 23, at AI.
176. Comments following paper presentation: Douglas Mossman, "Should
Psychiatrists Medicate Russell Weston?" AAPL Annual Meeting (Oct. 26, 2001).
As was noted earlier, most of the psychiatrists who testified at Weston's district court
hearing felt that involuntarily medication was in the defendant's interest, though the
medication could make him subject to prosecution. See supra, text at note 35.
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patient has a serious mental illness, is suffering, there is an efficacious
treatment, the patient is incompetent to make medical decisions, and a
judge or guardian makes a proxy decision for the patient. 177
Appelbaum's commentary on Sell implicitly takes an illness-focused
approach, too. He believes that:
Medical appropriateness, the absence of nonmedical therapies, and the
likely ineffectiveness of threats to hold psychotic prisoners in contempt
should be straightforward in almost all cases. But the strong suggestion
in the opinion that hearings be held first on the issue of
dangerousness. .. will lead to additional and often needless
litigation ....
As for Dr. Sell, ... [s]ix years after his arrest and more than four years
after he was first found incompetent to stand trial, he remains
imprisoned, psychotic, and untreated. 178
By contrast, some nonphysician commentators have felt that the extramedical legal consequences must play a role in deciding whether to
medicate a defendant-patient. Discussing Russell Weston's situation before
he began receiving psychotropic medication, Professor David Siegel of the
New England School of Law told National Public Radio:
There's not any other circumstance where we allow people to be
medicated [involuntarily] unless it's for their own good ... And it is
very difficult to say with a straight face that medicating Mr. Weston
under these circumstances, where the possible outcome could be his
being sentenced to death, is gonna help him." 179
Leonard Rubenstein, a lawyer and executive director of the Washingtonbased advocacy organization Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), told the
Washington Post that medicating Weston to achieve "the government's
interest in pressing a case . . . raises serious ethical issues for the doctor
charged with giving the medication.,,180 In an amicus brief urging the
Supreme Court to hear Weston's case, PHR argued that Weston's

177.

Alan A. Stone, The Right to Refuse Treatment: Sell v United States, PSYCHIATRIC
TIMES, Sept. 2003, at 1,9.
178. Appelbaum, supra note 80, at 1341. A year later, this remained the case; see
Carolyn Tuft, Sell Is Sent to Different Prison Hospital, ST. LOUIS PosT-DISPATCH, Nov. 30,
2004, at Bl (trial judge orders Sell sent to FCI-Butner for competence restoration after
Sell's attorneys report he "was so obsessed with mistreatment at Springfield that he could
not assist in preparing for trial").
179. Transcript, "Legal and Ethical Questions in the Case of Russell Weston Jr.,"
Morning Edition, May 16,2001.
180.
Tucker, supra note 46, at B I.
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dangerousness had been addressed by his confinement in a hospital. 181
George Annas, Chair of the Department of Health Law, Bioethics, and
Human Rights at Boston University, makes a similar point in an essay
about the Sell decision published in the New England Journal of Medicine.
Annas suggests that Sell's criminal charges were not serious enough to
justify forcing drugs upon him so that he could undergo trial,182 and thus
would not satisfy the Sell majority's requirement that medication have the
potential to "further important governmental trial-related interests.,,183 By
contrast, says Annas, Weston's case might be one in which the state's
interest in prosecution was important enough to justify forced medication.
However,
the important state interest at stake still must be articulated. Because
Weston is mentally ill and dangerous, for example, he is likely to be
civilly committed for a long time-at least until he is no longer a danger
to others. Thus, a criminal trial is not necessary to promote public
safety. 184
Annas then suggests that the needs and interests of individual patients
may conflict with the needs and interests of the criminal justice system. He
questions whether the state-employed psychiatrists who treat pre-trial
detainees might fail to appreciate this conflict, might inappropriately
identify with state interests, and might therefore make medication decisions
that satisfy the state's wishes for retribution at the expense of their
individual patients' welfare. By extending the circumstances in which
mentally ill persons can be forcibly medicated, concludes Annas, the Sell
decision has highlighted the dual loyalties of the forensic psychiatrist
whose patients are criminal defendants.
[P]sychiatrists can respond by taking the Supreme Court at its word that
competent adults should not be involuntarily medicated solely for the
convenience of the state ... Drugs should be prescribed by a physician
only if the physician makes an independent judgment that treatment is
in the patient's best medical interests. 185
Indeed, the doctors who advocated medicating Weston to alleviate his
symptoms, reduce his dangerousness, or decrease his suffering did not

181.
Brief of Physicians for Human Rights as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Weston v. U.S. (Nov. 8, 2001), available at http://www.phrusa.org/researchlmethics/phys_
briefhtm1) (last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
182.
George J. Annas, Forcible Medication/or Courtroom Competence - The Case 0/
Charles Sell, 350 N. ENGL. J. MED. 2297,2300 (2004).
183.
Sell, 539 U.S. at 179.
184.
Annas, supra note 182, at 2300.
185.
Id. at 2301.
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address a straightforward, important ethical argument. 186 This argument is
most easily appreciated by imagining the following response of a treating
psychiatrist who was asked whether medicating Weston for competence
restoration was really in his "best medical interests":
"As Weston's treating physician, I must consider not only whether
medication would safely and effectively address his psychotic
symptoms, but the consequences of my treatment. Even if I give
Weston antipsychotic therapy, he might not become competent. 187 Then
he would stay confined in a secure hospital, just as he is now.
"But if medication rendered Weston competent, he would stand trial for
murder. Acquittal is not possible; there is no doubt that Weston planned
and carried out the Capitol shootings. His trial could have only three
possible outcomes: an insanity acquittal, a guilty verdict with a life
sentence, or a guilty verdict and a death sentence.
"If found insane, Weston's prospects would be not much different from
those he now faces without medication: prolonged confinement in a
secure hospital setting. As John Hinckley's experience has shown,

186.
matter:

Here is how law professor and physician M. Gregg Bloche briefly described the

At hearings held in 1999 and 2000 to consider whether Weston should
be medicated, his prison physician acknowledged the tension between
the state's purposes and her therapeutic role .... Testifying for the
prosecution was Weston's psychiatrist, Sally Johnson. She conceded
that her main purpose was to make Weston competent to stand trialand that therapeutic success could lead to a death sentence. Yet she and
the prosecution denied any conflict between her duties to Weston and
the justice system.
By framing her clinical role in narrow, biological terms, unconnected to
Weston's personal fate, Johnson sought to steer clear of the obvious
conflict between Weston's and the government's interests: "I see him as
suffering from a mental illness that requires treatment for alleviation of
his symptom picture," she said, "and I feel no conflict in providing that
treatment to him."
M. Gregg Bloche, What Would Hippocrates Do?; When the State Calls, It's a Tough
Question, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at B2.
187.
Appelbaum observes, "Although medications are usually effective for the control
of psychotic symptoms, it [is] not always ... easy to establish in advance that a treatment
regimen is 'substantially likely' to restore competence." Appelbaum, supra note 80, at 1336.
See, however, studies cited supra note 13, reporting high rates of successful competence
restoration.
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obtaining release from the hospital might take decades,188 and given
what Weston did and the publicity his case has received, his release
might never occur.
"But there is no guarantee that a jury would find Weston would find
insane if he were tried. The government seems very unlikely to accede
to an insanity verdict without trial, which is the usual way criminal
defendants obtain insanity verdicts. National statistics show that few
defendants achieve insanity verdicts in jury trials,189 and given what
Weston did and the government's desire for a conviction, going to trial
would entail an especially high likelihood of a guilty verdict. If this
occurred, the best Weston could hope for is life in prison-that is,
confinement for the rest of his life, the same prospect he faces now
without medication. A guilty verdict could also result in a death
sentence, a worse prospect than Weston faces now.
"Even if I think Weston should take antipsychotic medication," the
treating psychiatrist continues, "he would not view that medication as
beneficial. He took antipsychotic medication during his Fall 1996
hospitalization, and stopped it shortly after leaving the hospital. For all
the supposed effectiveness of drugs, Weston saw no value in taking
them.
"Also, Weston functioned in society for years---often, it appears,
contentedly-without medication. In his present environment, he poses
little risk of harming others; his risk to himself is similar to the risk of
the many thousands of persons in our country who have untreated
schizophrenia.
"Because I am a treating psychiatrist," the argument concludes, "I am
bound by Hippocratic obligations to help my patients and do nothing
that would harm them. Medication would at best yield benefits that

188.
John W. Hinckley, Jr., attempted to kill President Reagan in March 1981. He
remains a patient at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, DC. Only in December 2003
did a federal judge permit Hinckley to have unsupervised visits with his parents off hospital
grounds. The Secret Service trails Hinckley when he makes off-grounds trips with hospital
personnel. Michael Janofsky, Man Who Shot Reagan Allowed To Visit Parents
Unsupervised, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2003, at AI. A year later, a federal court denied the
hospital's request to allow Hinckley to go on more lengthy passes. John Files, Judge Denies
Hinckley's Request For Extended Hospital Leaves, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 26, 2004, at A37.
189.
The most comprehensive study to date suggests that the insanity defense is used in
about one percent of felony cases and is successful about one-quarter of the time. Only
seven percent of successful insanity defenses are disposed of by a jury. Lisa A. Callahan et
aI., The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 331 (1991).
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Weston has never valued, and 'successful' treatment could well permit
trial, conviction, life imprisonment, or a death sentence. I conclude that
despite his illness, treating Weston with antipsychotic medication is not
in his interest and would therefore be unethical."

In support of this argument, a treating psychiatrist could cite several
ethical codes. 190 The AMA Principles of Medical Ethics ask the physician
to "respect the law" but also to "recognize a responsibility to seek changes
in those requirements which are contrary to the best interest of the
patient."J91 The Declaration of Helsinki states that when the patient is a
prisoner, "[t]he doctor's fundamental role is to alleviate the distress of his
or her fellow men, and no motive whether personal, collective or political
shall prevail against this higher purpose." 192 The World Medical
Association's International Code of Ethics lists, among the duties of
physicians, the obligation to "act only in the patient's interest when
providing medical care which might have the effect of weakening the
physical and mental condition of the patient" and to "always bear in mind
the obligation of preserving human life.,,193 The same association's
Declaration of Geneva requires the ph~sician to pledge, "The health of my
patient will be my first consideration." 94
What makes the argument against treating Weston so important is the
fact that a similar utilitarian calculus would bar the treatment of many other
mentally ill defendants, who might experience greater well-being if they
remained psychotic than they would if they had to face the probable
consequences of criminal prosecution, and for whom competence-restoring
medication would also enable successful prosecution. Charles Sell's case is
a well-publicized example of circumstances frequently encountered at
public hospitals that treat individuals found incompetent to stand trial:
patients receive competence-restoring treatment despite being untroubled
by their mental illnesses, and despite facing a high probability of
conviction and imprisonment if their treatment is 'successful. ,195 The
190.
For a useful historical summary of medicine's ethical commitment to helping and
avoiding harm to individual patients, see Donald P. Judges, The Role of Mental Health
Professionals in Capital Punishment: an Exercise in Moral Disengagement, 41 Hous. L.
REv. 515, 557-64 (2004).
191.
AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, No. 3 (2001), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html(last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
192.
WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DECLARATION OF TOKYO (1975), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/instree/tokyo.html(last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
193.
WORLD MEDICATION ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS,
available at http://www.wma.net/e/policy/cS.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
194.
Id.
195.
This sentence refers to "treatment," not just "medication." Hospitalized patients
who have disorders for which medication is the primary treatment also receive other
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Hippocratic obligations to help patients and "do no harm" seem to require
that in some circumstances, psychiatrists should withhold ordinary medical
treatment from psychotic, incompetent defendants to help their patients
avoid prosecution and punishment.
VII. UTILITy-MAXIMIZATION VERSUS A KANTIAN APPROACH I96

A. The Typical Physician's Pragmatic, Individualized Utilitarianism
Both Hippocratic principles and the moral basis for medical treatment
are more complex than physicians often acknowledge. Although physicians
ardently espouse the dictum "do no harm," they know that sometimes they
have to make their patients suffer. The treatments administered by surgeons
and oncologists often are agonizing, but physicians typically justify such
treatments to themselves and their patients using a utilitarian approach,
saying that the potential benefits outweigh the pain and risks associated
with therapy. In like manner, although some mental health procedures-

therapeutic measures, such as group therapy, individual therapy, education, and a peaceful
environment that is conducive to recovery. The ethical problem that I discuss here is not
peculiar to pharmacotherapy; any medical treatment that makes patients susceptible to
prosecution raises the same issue.
For two recent descriptions of competence restoration programs that emphasize
education during hospitalization, see Barry W. Wall et aI., Restoration of Competency to
Stand Trial: A Training Program for Persons With Mental Retardation, 31 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY LAW 189 (2003) (training for persons with mental retardation), and Lisa Jo
Bertman et aI., Effect of an Individualized Treatment Protocol on Restoration of
Competency in Pretrial Forensic Inpatients, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 27 (2003)
(deficit-focused education and legal rights training).
196.
Portions of this and the following section are modifications of previous
discussions of the justification of punishment in Douglas Mossman, The Psychiatrist and
Execution Competency: Fording Murky Ethical Waters, 43 CASE WESTERN REs. L. REV. 1,
53-88 (1992), and Douglas Mossman, Immoral, supra note 9, at 357-68. In this Section,
citations to English translations of Kant's works follow this scheme:
"KrV" = CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Norman Kemp Smith's translation of KRITIK DER
REINEN VERNUNFT (1781/87), New York, St. Martin's Press, 1965).
"Rechtslehre" = The Metaphysical Elements of Justice (John Ladd's translations of
Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Rechtslehre (1797), New York, Macmillan, 1965).
"KpR" = CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Lewis White Beck's translation of KRITIK
DER PRAKTISCHEN VERNUNFT (\788), 3rd ed., New York, Macmillan, 1993).
"GMS" = GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H. J. Paton's translation of
GRUNDLEGUNG ZUR METAPHYSIK DER SrrTEN (1785), New York, Harper & Row, 1964).
Unbracketed page numbers refer to pagination in the above English translations. Bracketed
page numbers utilize the standard method of reference to Kant's writings, (i.e., referring to
pagination in the Koniglich preuBische Akademie der Wissenschaften edition of KANTS
GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN).
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particularly involuntary hospitalization, physical restraint, and forcible
administration of medication-can be odious and frightening, psychiatrists
often justify these actions by arguing that patients, once restored to
rationality, will be better off and even thankful for having treatment thrust
upon them. 197 Physicians (psychiatrists among them) hew not to strict
policies of alleviating pain and "do no harm," but to an approach that might
be termed "individualized, pragmatic utilitarianism," in which they ask
themselves instead whether the gains individual patients will receive from
treatment are worth the discomfort or pain the treatment causes those
individuals.
As the previous section shows, however, the pragmatic utilitarian
considerations about individuals' consequences will often fail to justify
psychiatric treatment that restores competence to stand trial, and even lead
to the troubling conclusion that psychiatrists should sometimes withhold
treatment to keep their patients from suffering punishment. Physicians as a
group do not typically contemplate matters of political philosophy,198 but if

197. "For the past two decades, an important psychiatric rationale for involuntary
hospitalization has been that patients who initially object to being hospitalized change their
views after receiving hospital treatment .... It has been argued that patients may even be
grateful that clinicians overrode their initial refusals of hospital treatment. [Professor Alan
A.] Stone ... called this rationale for involuntary-hospitalization the 'thank you' theory."
William Gardner et aI., Patients' Revisions of Their Belieft About the Need for
Hospitalization, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1385, 1385 (1999) (citations omitted). Although
theoretically persuasive, empirical support for this assertion is lacking. For example, in the
just-cited study, the authors evaluated 433 inpatients shortly after admission and again after
discharge, and found that "[c]oerced patients did not appear to be grateful for the experience
of hospitalization, even if they later concluded that they had needed it." ld In an earlier
study, only a minority of involuntary patients later perceived their hospitalization as helpful.
James C. Beck and Edward A. Golowka, A Study of Enforced Treatment in Relation to
Stone's "Thank You" Theory, 6 BEHAV. SCI. LAW 559 (1988).
198. The late psychiatrist Karl Menninger represented a clear exception to this, and
offered an extended criticism of the desire to punish, which he saw as arising from sadistic
and vindictive feelings:
[B]ehind what we do to the offender is the desire for revenge on someone .... We
call it a wish to see justice done, i.e., to have him "punished." But in the last
analysis this turns out to be a thin cloak for vengeful feelings directed against a
legitimized object.
Personal revenge we have renounced, but official legalized revenge we can still
enJoy ....
Punishment is in part an attitude, a philosophy. It is the deliberate infliction of
pain in addition to or in lieu of penalty.
KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 190, 203 (1968). Menninger's argument
conflates the actual practice of punishment with its justification; simply because people
express inhumane views or feelings about criminals does not mean that punishment, as a
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the question were posed to them, I suspect they typically would justify the
need to administer punishment on utilitarian grounds. That is, physicians
might say that people do not naturally think about how their actions will
affect the general well-being, and therefore need social institutions to
engender appropriate feelings and attitudes about various forms of conduct.
Physicians might endorse a justification of punishment which (borrowing
from University of North Carolina Professor Thomas Hill's
characterization of a utilitarian approach to this topic) holds that people
need incentives for good conduct, and society needs "to instill internal
sanctions through training as well as relying on social pressure, rewards
and punishments, to induce people to maximize utility .... Social pressure
is a necessary and legitimate utilitarian means to get people to make utility
maximizing decisions,,,199 and punishment is a necessary institution that
benefits society by incapacitating miscreants and deterring other would-be
criminals.
Yet physicians would also say that subjecting a person to prosecution
and punishment is a moral matter,zoo and that it is not the business of
physicians (when they act in their social role as physicians) to express or
carry out acts of moral condemnation. Whereas the legitimate utilitarian
aims of punishment are proper concerns of the criminal justice system,
which serves society, the aims of physicians, insofar as they function as
deliverers of medical treatment, must focus on serving and protecting the
welfare of individual patients. Psychiatrist Alan Stone's commentary on the
Sell decision captures this contrast nicely:
[I]n cases like ... Sell the prosecutors are not primarily concerned with
treating the defendant, as we might be when we are dealing with a
patient. Their interest and the state's interest is to restore the patient to
competency so that they [sic] can be tried ... The needs of the criminal
justice system-not the needs of the patient-are the focus of these
legal controversies. In my view, the courts are asking and attempting to
answer the wrong questions. Involuntary psychiatric treatment, like any
other medical treatment, should be given only when the patient is
incompetent to make medical decisions and only when the goal of
treatment is to restore the person's mental health .... [T]he needs of
social institution, is unjustified. In fact, Menninger endorses Platonic and Kantian
justifications for retaliatory or retributive punishments, id. at 205-06, but prefers to call
criminal sanctions "penalties" to avoid vindictive connotations. "Penalties should be greater
and surer and quicker in coming," writes Menninger. "I favor stricter penalties for many
offenses, and more swift and certain assessment of them." ld at 202.
199. Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment, 18 LAW &
PHIL. 407, 423 (1999).
200.
See, e.g., id at 439 (suggesting "that punishment is an institution that in fact
conveys the moral disapproval of the community").
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the criminal justice system and the strategies of lawyers should not be
the basis of involuntary psychiatric treatment. 20 1

Yet, as important as risks and benefits are to making recommendations
about medical treatment, such concerns, which are at the center of the
typical physician's individualized utilitarian calculus, are not the ultimate
basis of medical treatment's permissibility. What really makes medical
treatment-or, more precisely, the actions of physicians who administer
it-morally and legally acceptable is the prior consent of patients. Consent
is central to the justification of medical treatment, and such considerations
underlie Stone's earlier-quoted point that involuntary administration of
psychotropic drugs may occur only after a judge or guardian has made "a
proxy decision for the patient.,,202 By recognizing this, psychiatrists (and
other physicians) gain a more sophisticated vantage point from which to
evaluate their ethical duties. A consent-based theory of medical ethics
allows medical care to be seen as one of many human interactions that
affirm and protect individuals' dignity and autonomy, and places medical
ethics in a larger moral context that encompasses many features of
interpersonal obligation. 203
Consent-based theories of political obligation figure prominently in
Anglo-American intellectual history. For example, in The Second Treatise
of Government, John Locke writes, "[E]very man, by consenting with
others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under
an obligation to every one of that society, to submit to the determination of
the majority, and to be concluded by it.,,204 Physicians wrestling with the
ethical questions surrounding the forced treatment of Sell, Weston, and
other individuals who are incompetent to stand trial should consider that
consent also is a central feature in prominent liberal defenses of criminal
sanctions. In particular, Immanuel Kant's theory of political authority
shares many features with consent-based justifications of physicianinduced suffering, and provides psychiatrists with an understanding of
punishment that makes it unnecessa~ to resolve apparent ethical conflicts
created by utilitarian considerations. 2 5
201.

Stone, supra note 177, at 9.

202.
ld.
203.
ROBERT M. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 108-38 (1981).
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT
204.
AND LETTER ON TOLERATION §97 (J. W. Gough ed., 2d ed., Basil Blackwell 1956) (1690).
My previous discussions of Kant's theories, cited supra note 196, relied
205.
extensively on the work of Professor Jeffrie G. Murphy, particularly KANT: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (1970), Kant's Theory of Punishment in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND
THERAPY 82 (1979), and Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 532
(1987). Murphy's writings offer a procedural interpretation of Kant's social contract similar
to that developed in JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Although I find this
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Kant's Philosophical Method

At the outset, it is important to layout two general aspects of Kant's
philosophical approach. First, a key feature of Kant's moral and political
theories is his unfailing emphasis on the dignity of individual persons. For
Kant, individual persons have value and intrinsic worth that are "infinitely
above all price," and their dignity is grounded in their autonomous capacity
to act in accordance with moral ~rinciples that they regard as applying to
themselves and everyone else. 2 6 This leads Kant to conclude, in his
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, that the basis for morality must
be his famous categorical imperative: "Act only according to that maxim
through which ~ou can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law." 07 Kant also shows that as a practical manner, this
categorical imperative is equivalent to stating that one must "[a]ct in such a
way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the
person of an~ other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time
as an end." 08 Neither legal nor moral principles may be justified by
considerations of general happiness, social benefits, or other utilitarian
considerations, but must instead be grounded in considerations of
individual rights. In the context of this Article's concerns, the significance
of this point is the following: If Kant is to find that a system of criminal
sanctions is justified, he must do so in a way that addresses and centralizes
the humanity of the· criminal himself. Thus, for psychiatrists concerned
about conflicts in their obligations to defendant-patients, a Kantian defense
of punishment, if successful, will preserve as a paramount value respect for
the personhood of an individual facing potential punishment-just as a
physician, by withholding treatment until consent is obtained, respects the
personhood of an individual undergoing treatment.
A second key aspect of Kant's moral and political theories is Kant's
"critical" approach, a "deductive" method that characterizes much of
Kant's mature philosophy. Kant assumes that certain of our notions, such
as the notion that we make choices and act freely, or (to take a legal
example) the notion that we may be rightful owners of property, are valid.
He sees the role of philosophy as attempting to show, not that freedom or
valid property ownership is possible-Kant assumes this is the case-but

approach appealing (and a convincing way to understand the force of political authority),
more recent scholarship suggests a different reading of Kant's theories. The present
discussion is indebted to Hill, supra note 199, and especially to the lucid explanations in
Kevin Thompson, Kant's Transcendental Deduction of Political Authority, 92 KANTSTUDJEN 62 (2001).
GMS at 102-103 [78-79].
206.
207.
GMS at 88 [52].

208.

GMS at 96 [66-67].
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how and why such notions are possible. The political authority that allows
and protects property ownership (and other fundamental rights) is
essentially a coercive force. 209 A key task for Kant's political philosophy,
then, is to show how political coercion can be justified within a moral
context that requires individuals always to be treated as ends in themselves.
One of Kant's methods for achieving resolution of philosophical
questions is what he terms a "transcendental deduction" of a regulative idea
of reason. Used in this context, the word "idea" ("Idee" in German) is
Kant's technical term for a necessary concept of reason that arises not from
sensing or experiencing something that actually exists, but that is an ideal
toward which reason strives as it organizes experience. 210 In general, the
role of a transcendental deduction of a regulative idea is to demonstrate that
reason can bring a specific area of its functioning into "systematic unity"
only by employing this idea. 21 I As Kevin Thompson of DePaul University
explains, Kant sees reason as "fundamentally a spontaneous activity of
human intellect striving to achieve order and systematicity.,,212 Those ideas
that allow reason to achieve coherence and arrive at "systematic unity" are
necessary rules or "maxims" that govern the area of reason under
consideration.2 I 3
C.

Rights and the Acceptance of Living in Civil Society

Kant sees justice as concerned not with personal motives or reasons for
doing things, nor with the intended goals of actions, but only with the effect
that one person's choices and ensuing actions can have on other persons.
Laws must apply to everyone equally, and thus, the key consideration for
evaluating the legal permissibility of a freely chosen action is whether that
action can be consistent with the freely chosen acts of all other persons.
Homologous with the categorical imperative, this freedom-maximizing

209. John Ladd, Translator's Introduction to Kant's THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF
JUSTICE xxvii-xxviii (New York, Macmillan 1965).
210.
ld. at xviii.
211. In the CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, Kant explains that "transcendental" knowledge
refers to knowledge "by which we know that-and how--certain representations (intuitions
or concepts) can be employed or are possible purely a priori. The term 'transcendental,' that
is to say, signifies such knowledge as concerns the a priori possibility of knowledge, or its a
priori employment." KrV at 96 [A56'=B80]. The "transcendental deduction of all ideas of
reason" involves showing that these ideas are "rules of the empirical employment of reason
[that] lead us to a systematic unity, under the presupposition of such an object in the idea;
and that they thus contribute to the extension of empirical knowledge, without ever being in
a position to run counter to it." From such a deduction, we conclude that reason must
"always proceed in accordance with such ideas." KrV at 550 [A671'=B699]
212. Thompson, supra note 205, at 66.
213.
Id.
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"Universal Principle of Justice" requires that "my action or my condition in
general can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a
universallaw.,,214
The law is not concerned with my motives for obedience-why I obey
the law-but only whether I am obedient. Therefore, I am not required to
adhere to the Universal Principle of Justice (and laws consistent with it) out
of a sense of moral obligation or any other virtuous personal motive, but
simply out of recognition that my "freedom is restricted in this way and
may be so restricted by others in practice.,,215 My having a right to act
freely, within the bounds of this restriction, entails a right to prevent others
from unjust hindrances of my freedom. Using coercion to counteract unjust
hindrances to freedom "is consistent with freedom according to universal
laws," and thus, any right I have to act in a permissible way "is united with
the authorization to use coercion against anyone" that interferes with my
right. 216
If I loan someone money, for example, my right to expect repayment
should not be regarded as the debtor's moral obligation to repay coupled
with my authorization to use coercion to convince him to do so. The debtor
may indeed have a moral obligation, but my "right means only that the use
of coercion" in any instance in which a debtor might fail to repay a creditor
"is entirely compatible with everyone's freedom, including the freedom of
the debtor, in accordance with universal laws. Thus 'right'... and
'authorization to use coercion' mean the same thing.,,217
We cannot conceive of a world in which persons had freedom to act, but
could not rightfully use or possess any real physical things on which to act.
Therefore, Kant's "Juridical Postulate of Practical Reason,,218 requires that
214.
RECHTSLEHRE at 35 [230].
RECHTSLEHRE at 35 [231].
215.
RECHTSLEHRE at 36 [231].
216.
RECHTSLEHRE at 37 [232].
217.
218.
Kant defines "practical reason" obliquely: "Only a rational being has the power to
act ... in accordance with principles-and only so has he a will. Since reason is required in
order to derive actions from laws, the will is nothing but practical reason." GMS at 80 [36]
(italics in original). That is, practical reason is the human faculty, often referred to as the
"will," that utilizes conscious motives (that is, motives or reasons of which we can be aware,
as opposed to impulses of which we are unconscious) to determine conduct. Lewis White
Beck, Translator's Introduction, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON xi (3d ed., Macmillan
1993). Kant believes that rational beings who exercise practical reason must be regarded as
free, because such beings explain their actions by giving their own reasons for what they do,
rather than regarding themselves as externally directed. Only under the "Idea of freedom"
can "the will of a rational being be a will of his own." GMS at 116 [101]. In Kant's
terminology, a "postulate of pure practical reason" is "a theoretical proposition which is not
as such demonstrable, but which is an inseparable corollary of an a priori unconditionally
valid practical law." CpR at 129 [122].
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I regard all objects of my potential choices as things that potentially could
be possessed by me or someone else. 219 This, in tum, "confers on us an
authorization ... to impose an obligation on all others ... to refrain from
using certain objects" if we have previously taken lawful possession (e.g.,
if we have legally acquired ownership) of those objects. 22o Such
obligations must come from universalizable rules, however, meaning that
any rational claim of legal possession that I might make would have to
contain "an acknowledgment of being reciprocally bound to everyone else
to a similar and equal restraint with respect to what is theirs.,,221
When I legally acquire a possession, I make a claim that entails coercive
force to preserve my ownership that extends beyond my own physical
powers to control that possession. At the same time, however, I must
respect the potential applicability to me of the same coercive force that may
be used to protect all others' legitimate claims of ownership. Moreover, in
claiming an entitlement to use coercive force to defend my ownership right,
I am also recognizing the legitimacy of all other persons' legitimate claims
of ownershi~ against me, and am thus affirming the very concept of legal
ownership.2 2 But all this is only possible in the context of a society where
laws protecting ownership can exist; the only kind of will that can bind
everyone in this way is a collective, universal will that operates through
public legislation, backed by coercive power, in civil society.223
Kant uses the philosophical term "state of nature" to refer not to any
actual period before societies formed, but rather, to a hypothetical
condition in which laws and legal systems do not exist. As our example
shows, absent law and legal systems, there is no possibility of legal
ownership enforced by legitimate political authority, only physical control
of possessions enforced by interpersonal violence, including preemptive
violence against any perceived threat to such control. In this hypothetical
state of "lawless freedom, ... [people] cannot wrong each other by fighting
among themselves; for whatever goes for one of them goes reci~rocally for
the other as though they had made an agreement to that effect." 24 One can
never be secure in one's ownership or anything else that requires mutually
recognized rights, because without a recognized legal system, "each will
have his own right to do what seems lust and good to him, entirely
independently of the opinion of others. ,,22 Kant therefore postulates "as an

219.
220.

RECHTSLEHRE at 52-53 [246].

22\.

RECHTSLEHRE at 64 [255].
Thompson, supra note 205, at 74-75.
RECHTSLEHRE at 65 [256].
RECHTSLEHRE at 71-72 [307].
RECHTSLEHRE at 76 [312] (emphasis added).

222.

223.
224.

225.

RECHTSLEHRE at 53 [247].
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a priori Idea of reason" that people should participate in a legal system "if
they ever could (even involuntarily) come into a relationship with one
another that involves mutual rights,,,226 because it is only within such a
system that one's ownership can "be established lawfully and secured ...
by an effective power" that is more than one's own mere physical
capacity.227
The very notion that we can have enforceable rights thus requires us to
give up the possibility of living in a lawless "state of nature" and to enter
civil society, where we subject ourselves (along with everyone else) to
"public lawful external coercion.,,228 Because consent is necessary to avoid
injustice, legislation (and with it, the establishment of rules for lawful
coercion) can only derive from "the united and consenting Will of all-that
is, a general united Will of the people by which each decides the same for
all and all decide the same for each.,,229 What makes such common consent
possible is the "original contract," which, on Kant's view, is the idea that
lets us conceptualize political legitimacy.23o Under this idea, we regard
ourselves as having agreed to renounce whatever individual freedom we
could exercise in the state of nature "in order to take it back again

226.
227.
228.
229.

70 [306].
RECHTSLEHRE at 76 [312].
RECHTSLEHRE at 76 [312].
RECHTSLEHRE at 78 [314].
RECHTSLEHRE at 80 [315]. Here, the term "idea" designates a Kantian "idea of
RECHTSLEHRE at

230.
reason." The function of the idea of the "original contract" emerges most clearly in his
essay, "On the Common Saying: this May Be True in Theory but it Does Not Apply in
Practice." Kant states that the original contract, through which a "completely lawful
constitution and commonwealth can alone be established," is something that we regard as
having arisen from "a coalition of the wills of all private individuals in a nation to form a
common, public will for the purposes of rightful legislation." Though such a contract does
not physically exist, and is
.. .in fact merely an idea of reason, ... [it] nonetheless has undoubted practical
reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they
could have been produced by the united will of a whole nation, and to regard each
subject, in so far as he can claim citizenship, as if he had consented within the
general will. This is the test of the rightfulness of every public law. For if the law
is such that a whole people could not possibly agree to it (for example, if it stated
that a certain class of subjects must be privileged as a hereditary class), it is
unjust; but if it is at least possible that a people could agree to it, it is our duty to
consider the law as just, even if the people is at present in such a position or
attitude of mind that it would probably refuse its consent if it were consulted. (TP
p.79).

For further discussion of the need for a distinction between the idea of the social contract
and a contract per se, see Vernon Thomas Sarver, Jr., Kant's Purported Social Contract and
the Death Penalty, 31 J. VALUE INQUIRY 455,467-68 (1997).
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immediately as members of a commonwealth.,,231 Living in civil society
does not require us to sacrifice personal freedom; rather, civil society
secures personal freedom by transforming it from a "wild, lawless"
condition into freedom under law, from freedom without the possibility of
rights into freedom in which rights can be asserted and protected. 232
Kant has thus succeeded in "deducing" the concept of civil society, with
its attendant laws and coercive power, as a condition of the possibility of
the freedom assumed in the exercise of practical reason. The notion of
mutual, consensual obligation achieved through a hypothetical social
contract enables reason to rationally order concepts such as lawfulness and
rightful ownership, which are necessary components of freedom in any
world where people cannot avoid having contact with one another. 233
D. The Role of Retribution
As we have seen, central to Kant's understanding of a political
constitution is the possibility of legitimate state coercion, one attribute of
which is "penal justice. ,,234 But this leaves open the question of what types
of punishments may justly be imposed on wrongdoers. One option might
be to create a set of uniform punishments based on what scientific
experiments might indicate, or on what experience has taught us, is
necessary to deter various crimes. This procedure would satisfy the purpose
of punishment as Kant defines it-assuring mutual respect for various
individual rights through coercive measures that deter violations of those
rights. Yet on Kant's view, such a procedure can be neither correct nor just
because respect for the humanity of others requires that whatever principle
we use to set punishments must be stipulated (or "deduced") a priori as a
condition of the possibility of freedom in a civil society, the primary legal
function of which is preserving just relationships between its members.
What experience (that is, information obtained a posteriori), might teach us
about suppressing crime cannot, therefore, be used to determine what
punishments are fair or just. 235
Instead, says Kant, the degree of punishment must be guided by "the
principle of equality ... , that is, the principle of not treating one side more
favorably than the other.,,236 This principle requires us to recognize that we

231.
RECHTSLEHRE at 80 [315]. As Kant uses the term, a commonwealth is "a union
proceeding from the common interest of all in having a juridical condition of society."
RECHTSLEHRE at 75 [311].
232.
RECHTSLEHRE at 80-81 [316].
233.
Thompson, supra note 205, at 76-77.
234.
RECHTSLEHRE at 151 [362].
235.
RECHTSLEHRE at 132 [363].
236.
RECHTSLEHRE at 101 [332].
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must treat the humanity of the criminal and the humanity of the victim
equally, and may only inflict on the criminal what he has, in his criminal
act, inflicted on another person. Admission of other considerations, such as
using the criminal as an example to others, is potentially unfair to the
criminal, who must always be treated as an end in himself. "The only time
a criminal cannot [rationally] complain that he is treated unjustly is when
he draws the evil deed back onto himself ... and suffers that which
according to the spirit of the penal law-even if not to the letter thereof-is
the same as what he has inflicted on others.,,237
Considerations of justice thus require the state to impose punishments
that are strictly retributive. The theoretical (Philosophical) justification for
having a system of punishment in civil society is coercive (i.e., to deter
would-be miscreants from violating laws that protect freedom by
preserving just relationships among people238). Yet punishment as actually
carried must be strictly retributive with the criminal's guilt being the
necessary and sufficient condition for a court's imposing a sentence. To
coerce (through "punishment") someone for a reason other than his having
committed of a crime-for example, to punish him in order "to promote
some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society"-would be to
manipulate him "merely as a means to the purposes of someone else." The
innate personhood of any individual, even an accused criminal, "protects
him against such treatment. . . He must first be found to be deserving of
punishment before any consideration is given to the utility of this
punishment for himself or for his fellow citizens.,,239
As a system of coercive threats, the institution of punishment would be
meaningless if punishments were not carried out, and the a priori deduction
of justification of punishment precludes selective considerations based on
individual circumstances. Failing to carry out a punishment for a crime that
the criminal had a fair opportunity to avoid would favor the criminal and
ignore the harm he has done. This would not merely be unfair; it would
also constitute a failure to treat the criminal as an end in himself.
Punishment is society's means for respecting the criminal's rationality, the
means through which the criminal experiences the rational consequences of
his freely chosen course of action. This is the case because punishment is a
social practice that all of us, including offenders themselves, would endorse
if we considered the rational justification of criminal justice from a neutral
standpoint and regarded the interests of others as equal to our own
desires. 24o

237.
238.

239.
240.

RECHTSLEHRE at 133 (363].
Hill, supra note 199, at 430.
RECHTSLEHRE at 100 (331].
Hill, supra note 199, at 430.
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For Kant, just punishment is also literally retributive. Most rational
persons will respond to a set of coercive measures by obeying the law,
thereby "paying back" (i.e., re-tributing) fellow citizens for their obedience
to law through reciprocation. When criminals choose to break laws,
however, they are also choosing to undergo punishment as an alternative
means of repaying fellow citizens for upholding the law. 241 This is another
reason why the wrong that the criminal commits determines his
punishment: punishment must be determined only by considering how the
criminal can properly repay society for his transgression:
Accordingly, any undeserved evil that you inflict on someone else
among the people is one that you do to yourself. . . . Only the Law of
retribution (jus talionis) can determine exactly the kind and degree of
punishment ... [as determined by] a court of justice (and not in your own
judgment). All other standards fluctuate back and forth and, because
extraneous considerations are mixed with them, they cannot be compatible
with the principle of pure and strict justice. 242
Kant's way of thinking about the role of punishment in society has
features that should appeal to physicians who treat accused criminals and
are concerned about their fate. Although someone who receives
punishment likely also receives the moral condemnation of the community,
moral condemnation is not the point of punishment. Rather, punishment is
a rationally necessary consequence of our enjoying rights in civil society. It
is administered because it is what fairness and disinterestedness require.
Society should not punish to make an example of the criminal, and
sentencing should not be an occasion for making gratuitous judgments
about the criminal's moral worth. Determining that someone deserves
punishment does not permit us to regard him "as worthless scum, utterly
incapable of reform. ,,243
Kant's theory also forbids us from regarding deterrence or rehabilitation
241.
Murphy, KANT, supra note 205, at 142-43. Cj U.S. v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496,
499-500 (S.D. N.Y. 1976).
242.
RECHTSLEHRE at 101 [332]. This limitation on punishment, states Professor Susan
Meld Shell of Boston College, debars the criminal from protesting his punishment or
arguing that he is being treated only as a means.
Injury arises whenever more is imposed upon my will than I am able to impose on
others .... But the criminal has, through the commission of his crime, placed a
real hindrance on the external freedom of another, a limit that exceeds the point
equilibrium of by which justice (or the system of external freedom) is itself
defined. To place a comparable hindrance on the freedom of the criminal is to
impose a bond on him that he cannot, in principle, claim as an injury, for it
imposes no more on him than he has imposed on others.
Susan Meld Shell, Kant on Punishment, 1 KANTIAN REVIEW 115, 121 (1997).
243.
Hill, supra note 199, at 439.
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as necessary or sufficient reasons to punish someone, and thereby precludes
the legal system from making judgments about the criminal's potential for
reform, his likelihood of future misbehaving, or his inner worthiness.
Punishment is a legitimate practice simply and precisely because society
requires coercive measure to preserve freedom, and because punishment
affirms everyone's humanity and autonomy, including the criminal's.
Through punishment, a criminal experiences the logical consequences of
his lawbreaking behavior. Legal denunciation through conviction and
punishment expresses civil society's belief in, and respect for, the
criminal's worthiness as a rational being, and affirms his moral value as a
responsible person. 244
VIII. IMPLICATIONS

A. The Value of Competence-Restoring Treatment and the
Obligation to Accept It
To summarize: whenever individuals live together, a reasonably fai~45
criminal justice system, with rules that specify infliction of punishment as
the response to crime, is a condition of the possibility of exercising
practical freedom and having rights. Making criminals undergo punishment
is an obligation of civil society, and a just legal system will assure that the
lawbreaker is dealt with only in ways that respect his rationality and
autonomy. These obligations provide two ways to understand why
psychiatrists whose actions may make possible a criminal's conviction or
punishment are not violating their obligations to help patients and avoid
harming them. 246

244. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 198-217 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed. 1987).
245.
Those who have suggested that treating Weston is unethical have not claimed that
it is the urifaimess of the criminal justice system-including, in Weston's case, the
possibility of the death penalty-that makes treatment wrong (although I suspect that
opposition to the death penalty may lurk behind their objections). For a short discussion of
this problem, see Mossman, Fording, supra note 196, at 56-59. I return to this matter infra,
Section IX.
It should be noted that although physicians have special means and skills through
246.
which they can fulfill obligations of beneficence and nonmaleficence, these obligations are
ones that are not peculiar to physicians. LEVITICUS 19: 18 instructs Jews and Christians,
"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Secular ethical schemes tell us that it is in
everyone's enlightened self-interest to be good to each other (see, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL,
UTILITARIANISM Chs. II, III (1863), in ETHICAL THEORIES: A BOOK OF READINGS 395, 412
(A. I. Melden ed. 1967)) and that absent any generally-accepted justification, is it never
morally acceptable for anyone to do another harm. See, e.g, PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL
LAW DEFENSES 121-28 (1984) for a discussion of the extent to which justification, among
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First, for an incompetent defendant who faces prosecution by a fair
criminal justice system, competence-restoring treatment represents a
potential benefit, even if the likely outcome of treatment is the defendant's
conviction and punishment. The benefit derives from the peculiar
circumstances and needs of that incompetent defendant. With regard to the
possible consequences of criminal prosecution, accused criminals, like all
of us, are bound by the demands of reason. Reason requires me to
recognize that I can enjoy autonomy in a world where I must interact with
other persons only by participating in civil 'society where judicially
imposed punishment is the response to violations of rights. What preserves
practical freedom in civil society are not the things that accused criminals
in fact say they want after their arrest, but what reason tells us is needed
when the social phenomenon of criminal behavior, and the threat it poses to
autonomy, are viewed from a disinterested standpoint.
If I become a criminal, it is unlikely that I will ask to be punished, and
my receiving punishment certainly should not depend on whether I think I
am guilty or what I think I deserve for my transgression. Rather, says Kant,
"it is the pure juridical legislative reason ... in me that submits myself to
the penal law as a person capable of committing a crime, that is, as another
person alon~ with all the others in the civil union who submit themselves to
this law.,,24 Not to regard an accused criminal as similarly submitting
himself to law would require me to treat him as less than my moral equal.
This a physician must not do, for it demeans the defendant as less than an
end in himself.
What does this tell us about defendants Charles Sell or Russell Weston,
who suffer from mental disorders that preclude their going to trial? Having
recognized that bringing accused persons to justice is a crucial248 and
logically required function of civil society (as well as an affirmation of the
accused's right to autonomous decision-making), competence-restoring
psychiatric treatment then becomes one desirable feature of a legal system
that treats everyone as an end in himself. Because competence-restoring
medical treatment makes prosecution allowable, it preserves the autonomy
and humanity of accused criminals by letting them satisfy their obligations
other criminal defenses, is exculpatory as a product of society's acceptance of the behavior
in general.
If, then, all citizens have obligations to do others good or at least to avoid harming
others, then punishment poses a potential moral problem for everyone, not just physicians.
Thus the same arguments that would justify physician actions in competence restoration
must all justify, mutatis mutandem, the actions of jurors who convict, judges who sentence,
jailers who effectuate sentences, and a society that, as a whole, collectively imposes
suffering on its members through the actions of the criminal justice system.
247. RECHTSLEHRE at 105 [335].
248.
For a discussion of this as a legal matter, see U.S. v. Weston, 255 F.3d at 880-81.
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under the social contract. For criminal defendants undergoing competence
restoration, treatment thus does not violate a psychiatrist's obligation to
help patients and not harm them, even if successful treatment will allow
those patients to be tried, convicted, and punished. Indeed the opposite is
the case: safe, effective, competence-restoring treatment is medically
appropriate because it is the incompetent defendant's vehicle for exercising
rationality and vindicating his autonomy. For a psychiatrist not to
administer such treatment would be an affront to the defendant's
personhood because the psychiatrist would regard the defendant-patient in
a way that the psychiatrist would not wish to be regarded: as an object to
control rather than as a responsible individual, as a thing rather than an end
in himself. 249
This leads to a second way of understanding the value of treatment,
inspired by what one might call a Kantian critique of how the Sell decision
tells trial courts to evaluate proposals for involuntary medication. Trial
courts, Sell states, should consider the seriousness of the defendant's
charges, any period of confinement that could count against the defendant's
sentence, and whether the defendant might, if not treated, be confined to a
psychiatric hospital for a lengthy period, which "would diminish the risks
that ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment one who has
committed a serious crime.,,250 Here, the Supreme Court seems to
contemplate what are, from a Kantian standpoint, three troubling prospects.
First, the Court appears to endorse a practice of tacitly assuming - without
a trial - that an accused defendant has committed an illegal act, followed
by use of civil commitment proceedings to confine that not-yet-foundguilty defendant if the factfinder thinks the defendant committed the act
charged. Second, trial courts are given constitutional imprimatur to
somehow calculate the added practical value of pursuing justice through
prosecuting someone, rather than simply isolating him from society without
249.

Loyola University Professor Gary Herbert comments:

Accusing the miscreant of having injured a person means recogmzmg the
miscreant, too, as a person, as a being who is defined by his relationship with
persons rather than mere things. By implication, the person who asserts the right
of humanity in his own person acknowledges his freedom, his humanity, his
rights, his capacity to obligate others, and, coincidentally, but not unimportantly,
the legitimacy of his [own] punishment when he fails to act according to the law.
Failure to punish would be to recognize him as nothing more than an animal will
whose responsibility for what he does is precluded by the fact that he is a mere
creature of inclinations to which he is bound, and of which he is not the author. He
must be held responsible.
Gary B. Herbert, Immanuel Kant: Punishment and the Political Preconditions of Moral
Existence, 23 INTERPRETAnON 61, 66 (1995).
250.
Id. at 180.
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a criminal trial. Third, the Court provides a mechanism for creating a class
of psychiatric hospital inmates who have been accused of crimes, for whom
treatment to allow prosecution has been ruled out, but who are nonetheless
confined because they are deemed dangerous.
Of course, legal decisions to punish criminals typically lead to
confinement, which coincidentally protects the public from the criminals'
future acts. But punishment in these cases is justified as society's
promised-in-advance response to any miscreant's act. Punishment, then, is
merely a just, retributive response to a proven misdeed. It contains no value
judgment about the miscreant's liberty or possible future behavior. It is
(and must be) carried out to make credible the system of coercive threats
that preserves individual freedom. By contrast, to deprive an accused
criminal of a trial, to deem him dangerous, and to make him an inmate in a
psychiatric hospital because he is a threat to society simply treats him as an
object. Handled this way, the accused criminal becomes merely a means to
an end rather than a responsible end in himself. Had he instead been
punished for doing something that violated others' rights and thereby
threatened society, the criminal would have had the opportunity to consider
and acknowledge matters that each offender should rationally
acknowledge: his own misdeed and the need for law enforcement to
preserve freedom. Punishment thus gives offenders the chance, at least, to
identify their personal failings and accept responsibility for them. By
contrast, mere confinement of a psychotic individual without giving him
competence-restoring treatment robs him of the chance to appreciate what
he has done and why his alleged act should merit criminal sanction.
B. Application to Actual, Treatment-Refusing Defendants
Thus, as a corollary of their participation in civil society, persons
accused or convicted of crimes should be regarded as having given their
hypothetical, rational consent to a social contract that provides for bringing
accused criminals to trial and that includes procedures for giving
psychiatric treatment to those defendants whose mental problems would
otherwise preclude their being prosecuted fairly. But what about actual
situations with real pretrial detainees? What should psychiatrists do when
confronted with defendants (or their attorneys) who, like Sell and Weston,
are opposed to competence-restoring treatment? How does hypothetical
consent to treatment affect actual treatment refusals?
These questions have a two-part answer. First, Kant's deduction of
consent to the conditions of a social contract, including the condition to
undergo punishment, would be meaningless unless deducted consent
outweighed a defendant's actual desire to circumvent punishment. To a
criminal defendant who protested, "Who cares about Kant's theory or any
other theory? I don't want to be punished!", we would respond that Kant's
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theory tells us what desires and other considerations count when deciding
how to treat criminals. As University of Illinois Professor Samuel
Fleischacker puts it, the criminal may choose to ignore laws and the
consequences of breaking them, but society does not, and society may
therefore hold the criminal responsible "whether or not he wants to
acknowledge those laws .... Civil society runs on the principle 'every
citizen shall live under his own,' whether he chooses rational or irrational
law for himself.,,251 Or, as Professor leffrie Murphy explains,
The test for an illegitimate interference with freedom cannot ... be that
the interference thwarts the particular empirical wishes or desires that a
citizen might have -at the moment. (If this were so, we could never
punish at all, for what criminal wants to be punished? ... ) The test,
rather, must be this: a Law's interference with freedom is justified ...
even if it thwarts desires, so long as it does not thwart the rational will
of any citizen ... Consent is required for justice, but it is hypothetical
rational consent-a consent to be modeled in social contract terms. 252

Thomas Hill makes a similar point:
The law's threat of punishment is to each citizen, but once offenders
have ignored it[,] what is relevant is the relation between the law and
the individual offenders. They disregarded the legitimate threat
addressed to them [i.e., the prospect of punishment for crimes], and the
law has, in general, a morally justifiable right to «arry out what it has
threatened to them. By hypothesis, they have no complaint against the
system. . . The court imposes the punishment on individuals because
that is the law, not because it is a means to frighten others .... [T]he
courts thereby respect the humanity of offenders as an end, though this
provides the offenders no escape from the legitimate sanction that, by
their free choice, they willfully incurred. 253

Second, medical ethics recognizes that explicit consent is not the only
valid basis for treatment. When most of us seek medical care, we do not
give our doctors explicit verbal or written consent for being examined, nor
do we explicitly consent to taking prescribed medication. Instead, we
signify our consent for treatment by going to the doctor's office or having
the pharmacist fill a prescription. When doctors treat unconscious or
delirious patients in emergencies, the treatment is ethically permissible
because it is the sort of thing to which most reasonable persons would

251.
Samuel Fleischacker, Kant's Theory of Punishment, 79 KANT-STUDIEN 434, 44243 (1988) (footnote omitted).
252.
Murphy, Does Kant, supra note 196, at 528.
253.
Hill, supra note 199, at 441 (italics in original).
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consent if they could. 254
These answers illuminate how hypothetical rational consent bears on the
problem of giving competence-restoring treatment to a defendant who
either explicitly refuses medication or is too impaired to express a valid
wish about getting medication. A defendant's consent to treatment is one
aspect of his larger consent to freedom under law within the original
contract. Given the existence of mentally disordered defendants, one
feature of a criminal justice system consistent with this contract is a means
for providing competence-restoring treatment to those defendants who
otherwise could not participate in their own legal proceedings. In effect, all
members of civil society agree to fair, impartial procedures that permit
conscientious administration of competence-restoring treatment as a way to
allow society to treat us as ends in ourselves (that is, as a human beings
who may answer for wrongdoing through punishment) and not merely as a
means (as irrational creatures to be confined because of dangerousness).
This is not to say that clinicians should not obtain legal clarification - a
court's written approval - before treating incompetent defendants who do
not or cannot explicitly consent to treatment. Recognizing the presence of
consent under a social contract simply clarifies how medical ethics applies
to patients for whom punishment could well follow successful treatment.
If a physician believes that the legal system will treat a defendant-patient
fairly, then the extra-medical, prosecution-enabling consequences of
competence-restoring treatment do not conflict with Hippocratic
obligations of beneficence and nonmaleficence. Defendants are entitled to
psychiatric treatment that may permit prosecution, and by providing
defendants with such treatment, doctors assure that civil society will fulfill
its obligation to respect the rationality and humanity of all persons.
IX.

THE POTENTIAL DEATH PENALTY

The above discussion assumes that, whatever the overall merits of the
United States criminal justice system, a physician believes that the system
will treat his defendant-patient fairly. In the case of Charles Sell, who was
able to bring his case all the way to the Supreme Court, this assumption
seems reasonable, but it may not hold true in all cases or in all aspects of
every case. Russell Weston's situation provides a good example of the
issues here. On the one hand, despite his being indigent, Weston has been
represented by highly-skilled, publicly funded attorneys whose budget has
allowed them, among other things, to retain nationally-recognized forensic
psychiatrists as defense consultants and potential experts. On the other
hand, features of Weston's situation - the distorting effects of the high
publicity his case has and may continue to receive, and (especially) the
254.

See, e.g.,

GUTHEIL

& APPELBAUM, supra note 12, at 158-59, 161-62.
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possibility of capital punishmen~55 will for some readers invalidate the
assumption of fair treatment.
Kant saw nothing wrong with capital punishment,256 but many U.S.
psychiatrists do. They oppose the death penalty either because they believe
it is intrinsically wrong to execute criminals or because they believe that
the United States cannot administer capital punishment equitably. These
psychiatrists could argue that Kant was wrong about the death penalty,257
and that even if one generally accepts Kant's views about the humanityrespecting function of punishment, treating Weston and restoring his
competence involuntarily would be lending tacit approval to, and would
constitute participation in, an unjust or immoral process, a process in which
no psychiatrist should engage. For psychiatrists who hold this view, the
possibility of the death penalty seems a valid reason for arguing that
administering competence-restoring treatment is "medically inappropriate,"
and that all psychiatrists should be barred from restoring the competence of
Weston and of any other death penalty defendant. 258

255.
Weston's case is far from the only one in which a defendant faces the prospect of
receiving competence-restoring treatment that may allow conviction and a death sentence.
See, e.g., William C. Lhotka, Medicating Suspect in 3 Killings Is Argued: Judge Refuses to
Weigh Potential Death Penalty, ST. LOUIS PosT-DISPATCH, June 2, 2004 (judge states
possibility of death penalty is not a factor in deciding whether to forcibly administer
medication for competence restoration), Janice Morse, Murder Suspect's Sanity at Issue: If
Medication Forced, Death Trial in Future, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 6, 2004, at BI (trial
court to hold hearing on forcing incompetent defendant to take medication so he can be tried
on capital murder charges), Matthew B. Stannard, Forced Medication of Suspect Sought;
Man Could Stand Trial with Drugs, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 20, 2002, at AI7 (prosecutor to file
motion ordering psychotropic medication for potential death penalty defendant), and Mike
Tolson, Yates Found Guilty; What's in Store for Yates in Prison?, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 13,
2002, at Al (woman who voluntarily received antipsychotic medication before trial faced
possible death penalty).
256.
For example, Kant argued that execution was the only appropriate punishment for
murder because there could be "no sameness in kind [as the principle of equality requires]
between death and remaining alive even under the most miserable conditions."
RECHTSLEHRE at 101 [332].
257.
See, e.g., Sarver, supra note 230, at 470-71 (arguing that irreversibility and
possible errors in administration of the death penalty is incompatible with Kant's ov::rall
theory of respect for humanity). For a discussion of how respect for humanity and capital
punishment are consistent under Kant's theory, see J. Angelo Corlett, Foundations of a
Kantian Theory ofPunishment, 31 S. J. PHIL. 263, 275-76 (1993).
258.
For a recent overview of this debate within the American Academy of Psychiatry
and the Law, see Michael A. Norko, Organized Psychiatry and the Death Penalty: An
Introduction to the Special Section, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 178 (2004)
(describing proposed referenda concerning capital punishment), Abraham L. Halpern et aI.,
Now Is the Time for AAPL to Demonstrate Leadership by Advocating Positions of Social
Importance, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 180, 180-81 (2004) (arguing that most
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Yet to argue this is to suggest that these defendants' own feelings about
what should happen to them-feelings that, while incompetent, they cannot
articulate because they do not comprehend their situations-should never
come to light. As the existence of death row "volunteers" for execution
shows,259 some persons convicted of capital crimes prefer execution to life
mpnson.
But arguing for a general bar to restoration of capital defendants raises a
much larger issue, for it suggests that psychiatrists have some special moral
status that obligates them, when opportunities present themselves, to use or
withhold their medical privileges and skills in ways that interfere with the
workings of the criminal justice system. If such a special status were
conceded, it could surely justify psychiatric opposition to (and interference
with) treatment in many more cases than Weston's. In any criminal casecapital or noncapital-where a psychiatrist believed the potential legal
events following successful treatment of a mentally ill defendant were less
desirable than having his patient remain incompetent to stand trial, or in
any case where a psychiatrist believed his patient might not receive optimal
treatment by the legal system, this special status would obligate the
physician to block or withhold competence-restoring treatment. To concede
"special status" obligations for psychiatrists also suggests that doctors
might rightfully lie about a pre-trial detainee's mental condition to help a
patient-defendant avoid a possibly unfair legal result. Or, doctors could
interpret George Annas's suggestion to make "an independent judgment
that treatment is in the patient's best medical interests,,260 as an invitation
to conclude that antipsychotic therapy is "medically inappropriate," and
offer testimony accordingly.
If courts knew that doctors might behave in these ways, there would be
ample reason to limit, disregard, or even eliminate physician participation
in legal proceedings. But leaving such consequences aside, it seems
arrogant for psychiatrists to suggest that their professional ethics and status
AAPL members support an official organizational stance against capital punishment, and
that only the abolition of capital punishment will stop physicians from assisting with actual
executions), Roy O'Shaughnessy, AAPL and Sociopolitical Policy, 32 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCillATRY LAW 184 (2004) (reviewing history of referenda, and holding that by alienating
a minority of members, an official sociopolitical position would undermine educational and
scientific goals), and John Gunn, The Royal College of Psychiatrists and the Death Penalty,
32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 188, 190 (2004) (noting that within the British medical
profession, official opposition to capital punishment is noncontroversial).
259. For discussions of recent examples in Ohio, see Alan Johnson, Inmates' Death
Wish Raises Ethical Questions, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 6, 2004, at lA (discussing three
cases), and Jim DeBrosse, Ferguson Gets Wished-For Death Penalty, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, Sept. 13, 2003, at Al (capital defendant requests and receives death sentence,
notwithstanding advice of his attorneys).
260.
Annas, supra note 182, at 2301.
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as medical doctors require them to interfere with administration of
democratically enacted laws. A psychiatrist who believes the death penalty
is immoral might understandably wish to avoid participating in courtordered restoration of a capital defendant's trial competence, and no
physician should be required to ignore what his conscience dictates. But an
individual psychiatrist's principled objection to the death penalty does not
support an ethical argument that all psychiatrists should be barred from
giving any capital defendant competence-restoring treatment.
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